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Abstract
This paper examines whether propaganda broadcast over radio helped to change inter-
ethnic attitudes in post-genocide Rwanda. We exploit variation in exposure to the gov-
ernment’s radio propaganda due to the mountainous topography of Rwanda. Results of
lab-in-the-field experiments show that individuals exposed to government propaganda have
lower salience of ethnicity, increased inter-ethnic trust and show more willingness to interact
face-to-face with members of another ethnic group. Our results suggest that the observed
improvement in inter-ethnic behavior is not cosmetic, and reflects a deeper change in inter-
ethnic attitudes. The findings provide some of the first quantitative evidence that the salience
of ethnic identity can be manipulated by governments.
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I. Introduction
Can a government in an ethnically divided, conflict-ridden society help bridge the ethnic
divide? A large literature argues that more conflict, higher corruption, weaker institutions
and lower economic growth all plague countries with ethnic divisions.1 In this context,
nation-building - in the form of increased ethnic trust, cooperation, and reduced ethnic
salience - may have the potential to undercut the roots of inter-ethnic violence.2
This paper examines the role of propaganda as a tool of nation-building in Rwanda - a
country in which Hutu extremists massacred more than 70% of the minority Tutsi population
in 1994 in one of the worst genocides in recorded history. Critics of the government’s program
of post-genocide nation-building (e.g. Thomson (2011a)), have noted how difficult it is to
assess whether progress in ethnic reconciliation is cosmetic or real. In large part, this is
because, under President Kagame, Rwanda is a quasi-autocracy that controls the media and
tries to manage the narrative on reconciliation. In fact, according to a recent report on
Rwanda in the New York Times: “Mr. Kagame has created a nation that is orderly but
repressive...Against this backdrop, it is difficult to gauge sentiment about the effectiveness of
reconciliation efforts.”3
Accordingly, we evaluate the Rwandan government’s efforts to reshape ethnic attitudes
through radio propaganda, by implementing a series of lab-in-the-field experiments that mea-
sure ethnic attitudes. Our design exploits village-level variation in reception of government-
owned-and-operated Radio Rwanda - the result of the mountainous topography of Rwanda
(colloquially known as the land of a thousand hills). Our empirical strategy is similar in
spirit to Yanagizawa-Drott (2014) but relies on contemporary variation in Radio Rwanda
rather than historical variation in the hate-radio station RTLM.4 We combine GIS data
1See Easterly and Levine (1997); Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2004), Blattman and Miguel
(2010).
2See Alesina and Ferrara (2005), Alesina et al. (2016) for evidence, and Besley and Persson (2011)
(Chapter 7) on the importance of “cohesiveness” of inter-group preferences for development.
3This is a from “How a Nation Reconciles After Genocide Killed Nearly a Million People” by Megan
Specia in April 25, 2017. (emphasis added)
4The first paper to exploit variation of signal transmission for examining economic outcomes is Olken
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showing the reach of radio signals with data from a survey, and lab-in-the-field experiments
on inter-ethnic attitudes conducted with 438 subjects in 52 villages in rural Rwanda.
We examine four main outcomes, each of which sheds light on aspects of inter-ethnic
attitudes. The first aims to measure the salience of ethnic identity and the second measures
a subject’s willingness to engage in a cooperative task with a partner from another ethnic
group. We also collected data on both a private and a public version of the trust game and
supplemented this with simple survey questions on in-group and out-group trust. Of course,
the key to this exercise relies on the ability to identify the ethnic identity of all subjects. This
is particularly challenging since the Rwandan government typically forbids researchers from
directly asking subjects if they are Hutu or Tutsi. Navigating this challenge was facilitated
by our discovery of a proxy for Tutsi ethnicity: whether or not the subject was eligible
to receive funds from the Fund for the Assistance of Survivors of the Genocide5 (known
as F.A.R.G.). F.A.R.G is a reparations fund available only to genocide “survivors” (read:
Tutsi). Armed with these data, we examine the impact of radio propaganda on inter-ethnic
behavior and ethnic salience.
Our first outcome is a measure of ethnic salience. Several studies suggest that ethnic
salience may be weak when individuals do not expect ethnicity to matter for the allocation
of economic or political rewards.6 Finding a measure of ethnic salience that is both plausible
and easy to measure in a country such as Rwanda presents a research challenge. To address
this challenge, in this paper, we introduce a new methodological tool to economics - the
salience of identity test (SIT).7 The test provides a simple way to capture whether a subject
subconsciously or consciously categorizes others on the basis of his or her ethnicity: in this
case Hutu or Tutsi. The test involves a recall task centered on matching pictures of Hutu and
(2009) who examined impact of watching TV on social capital in Indonesia.
5This is translated from French. The original name of the fund in French is: “Fonds d’Assistance aux
Rescape´s du Ge´nocide”
6The pull of national identity has also been shown to influence inter-ethnic attitudes. Gibson and Gouws
(2005) show how the pull of national identity weakened inter-group antipathy in South Africa. Also see
Sniderman and Carmines (1997) and Eifert et al. (2010).
7Versions of this test have been used in cognitive psychology and the classic reference is Taylor et al.
(1978) - we discuss this much more systematically later in the paper.
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Tutsi men to associated generic (neither positive nor negative) statements. If we find that an
individual is systematically more likely to mistakenly attribute a statement that corresponds
to one Hutu to another Hutu rather than a Tutsi, we say that this is because ethnicity is
salient for that subject. We find that ethnicity is less salient in regions exposed to the
government’s nation building rhetoric. Individuals in exposed regions are 10-13 percentage
points (≈ 0.39 standard deviations) less likely to categorize others on the basis of their
ethnicity, as measured by the SIT (mean 86%).
The second outcome is a partner selection task. We asked villagers to select, from a
pool of fifteen other subjects, the five that they would most like to be partnered with for a
cooperative face-to-face interaction. Residents of villages with exposure to Radio Rwanda
were 15.6 percentage points, or about 0.54 standard deviations, more likely to choose someone
of the other ethnicity with whom to engage in a cooperative social task.
The third outcome is a survey measure of inter-ethnic trust. Respondents in villages
exposed to Radio Rwanda are about a quarter point on a Likert scale (0.35 s.d.) more likely
to respond that they trust members of the other community, but they do not report being
more or less trusting of members of their own community.
The fourth outcome comes from behavior in a trust game. Each subject played either a
private or a public variant of the trust game. The private trust game results are consistent
with the other three outcomes. Inter-ethnic trust offers in the private trust game are 47%
higher, or 1.13 standard deviations, in areas that receive a radio transmission from Radio
Rwanda. Further, radio transmission does not seem to influence trust between members
of the same ethnic group. Our results suggest that radio propaganda seems to have been
successful at targeting inter-ethnic relationships rather than levels of generalized or overall
trust.
One of the key criticisms of nation building and reconciliation in Rwanda is that there
has been no real change in inter-ethnic attitudes. Thomson (2011a) has argued that observed
changes in behavior are solely due to “ritualized dissimulation and strategic compliance.”
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Similarly, Ingelaere (2010) argues that any observed improvement in inter-ethnic relation-
ships is merely cosmetic, since the populace masks its true feelings about ethnic relations,
and pretends to get along with those of the other ethnicity to avoid attracting government
attention. The results from the public version of the trust game suggest that government
propaganda may have aligned public and private behavior. Trust offers in the public game
are over 25% higher than private trust offers (0.58 standard deviations) in regions not ex-
posed to Radio Rwanda. In contrast, trust offers in public and private games are very similar
in radio regions.
Taken together the evidence suggests that exposure to government radio leads to higher
inter-ethnic trust and cooperation as well as lower ethnic salience.
We examine whether alternative mechanisms or confounds could explain the above empir-
ical patterns. For instance, given that radio transmission (most specifically the radio station
RTLM) was used to incite violence during the 1994 genocide (Yanagizawa-Drott 2014), in all
our empirical specifications we directly control for coverage by RTLM as well as for genocide
prosecutions, even though no evidence suggests that radio towers were built strategically to
target villages that were ultimately affected by the genocide.
We can also rule out that reception of stations other than Radio Rwanda affects the
outcomes that we study. Moreover, the main results are robust to including controls both
for the reception of other signals (including RTLM), and for distance to the nearest three
broadcast towers.
Furthermore, we can rule out, to various degrees, that dimensions of trust in Radio
Rwanda regions could be an accidental by-product of economic development; that measure-
ment error in the ethnicity proxy is affecting estimates; as well as that confounding effects,
such as migration or strategic radio tower placement, are a factor.
This paper contributes to three areas of social science research. First, consider the
literature on politics and the media (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2008). Much of this literature
suggests that a politicized media seems to have (at best) modest effects in influencing party
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vote shares and electoral outcomes in competitive democracies such as the United States
(see Gentzkow et al. (2014) and for a survey Stro¨mberg (2015)). The situation may be
quite different in countries with autocratic or nascent democratic political institutions. For
instance, a few studies that suggest that media and propaganda can help drive a wedge
between groups and exacerbate conflict as in Yanagizawa-Drott (2014), which was the first
paper to exploit the mountainous topography of Rwanda to identify the impact of radio
(the now defunct RTLM) on the genocide. Similarly, we see that exposure to Serbian radio
catalyzed anti-Serbian sentiments in Croatia (DellaVigna et al. 2014). We see similar effects
of radio on Nazi party popularity and anti-Semitic actions in Nazi Germany (Adena et al.
2015). By contrast, we have fewer studies that examine how media can bring groups together
and erase ethnic cleavages. In the Rwandan context, Paluck (2009) and Paluck and Green
(2009) demonstrate that media does have the potential to improve inter-ethnic attitudes.
They examine subjects who are exposed to a reconciliation soap opera on radio, for four
segments of twenty minutes each, once a month for a year. They find that radio programming
can improve self-reported attitudes, leading to greater tolerance of dissent and increased
openness to ethnic intermarriage. Our study builds on this work by showing that not only
are improvements possible but that the Rwandan government has actually realized these
achievements at a countrywide level (Thomson 2011b).
Second, our paper directly contributes to the literature on nation building. Many country-
specific studies have focused on the role of the state in catalyzing nation building, including
France (Weber 1976), Italy (Duggan 2007), and Singapore (Ortmann 2009). Our results on
the erasure of ethnic identity suggest that social identity is malleable, even in a relatively
short time frame. Miguel (2004) emphasized the importance of nation building in changing a
country’s inter-ethnic culture by showing that nation building in Tanzania allowed ethnically
diverse communities to raise more resources for local public goods than in neighboring Kenya.
Alesina and Reich (2013) provide a theoretical analysis of a government’s incentives to engage
in nation building. They point out that autocratic governments representing a minority
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group may undertake some of the more aggressive forms of nation building - a finding that
is consistent with what we observe in Rwanda.
Third, this paper relates to the literature on the economics of identity. The seminal work
on the economics of identity by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) examines how identity affects
economic outcomes. As Sen (2007) has pointed out, individuals can choose from a multiplic-
ity of identities - be it gender, race, class or any ascriptive marker. Indeed, evidence suggests
that social identity and preferences are malleable in a laboratory environment (Chen and Li
2009; Benjamin et al. 2010, 2013); and that they respond to real-world exogenous events,
such as bombings in Israel (Shayo and Zussman 2011). These influences can be quite per-
sistent (Voors et al. 2012; Voigtla¨nder and Voth 2012; Shayo and Zussman 2016). However,
our results suggest that the salience of identity is a choice variable that is manipulated by
political entrepreneurs - with rich implications for how to model identity politics in political
economy (see discussion in Fearon and Laitin (2000)).8
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section II we provide the historical
background and the contemporaneous political context in Rwanda. The experimental pro-
tocol is described in section III, while section IV describes our experimental measures and
data. Section V describes the empirical strategy while section VI presents all our results.
We examine alternative mechanisms and examine the robustness of our results in section
VII and conclude with a short discussion in section VIII.
II. Ethnicity, Politics and Nation Building
By the end of the 15th century, the Hutu and Tutsi settled the African Great Lakes region.
Political power was gradually consolidated into two dynasties whose geographical ambit ap-
proximately corresponds with present-day Rwanda and Burundi. Rwanda is now composed
8Esteban and Ray (2008), Shayo (2009), Caselli and Coleman (2013) and Mukand and Rodrik (2018)
explore some of the theoretical underpinnings of the politics of identity salience. More generally, our findings
provide evidence in favor of the social constructivists (such as Smith (1991) or Gellner (1983)) about the
political construction of national identity that may overwhelm primordial characteristics (see Cerulo (1997)
for a survey).
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of three main ethnic groups: the Hutu and Tutsi who make-up over 97% of the population,
and the Twa, who represent the remainder. Germany laid claim to the region during the
colonial scramble for Africa, and this claim was recognized by other European powers in 1891.
The First World War resulted in a transfer of administration of the kingdoms of Ruanda-
Urundi to Belgium, which administered the region starting in 1916. In 1962 Ruanda-Urundi
was given independence, and Rwanda and Burundi were formed.9
During the colonial period, a combination of direct and indirect rule fostered the idea of
Tutsi superiority over the Hutu and hardened resentment of each ethnic group for the other.
By the time of independence in 1962, these two ethnic categories were politically salient
with both groups represented by ethnic political parties - the Hutu by PARMEHUTU and
the Tutsi by UNAR. With independence, Belgium switched its political support from the
minority Tutsi to the majority Hutu, and the PARMEHUTU party assumed power. Over
the next three decades the underlying political dynamic was one of continuous, low-intensity
Hutu-Tutsi conflict (with the Hutu in power) that boiled into the Rwandan Genocide in
April 1994.10 Over a 100-day period between April and July 1994, as many as 1 million
people were killed, and more than 70% of the Tutsi population was slaughtered. In terms
of percentage of the population, it is one of the worst genocides in recorded history. The
Tutsi-controlled Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) ended the civil war when it took control of
Kigali in July of that year. Gradually, over the next few years the RPF asserted control and
after the nominally free elections of 2003, Paul Kagame officially took over the Presidency.11
After taking over as head of the government, President Kagame and the RPF made rec-
onciliation a top priority. The ostensible reason for the nation-building exercise was that
a minimal degree of inter-ethnic rapport was essential not only for economic development,
but also to prevent genocide in the future. Accordingly, the National Unity and Reconcili-
ation Commission (NURC) was established and tasked with building inter-ethnic trust and
9For a historical overview of Rwanda and Burundi see Newbury (2001) and Mamdani (2012).
10For details on post-independence political developments and especially the genocide see Meredith (2013),
Gourevitch (1998), Hatzfeld (2009)
11For an account of the rise of the RPF and that of Kagame see Stephen (2008).
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forging a new Rwandan identity. The NURC mandate is quite broad, and the commission
implemented a substantial package of policies nationally, with the aim of promoting a new
Rwandan identity. We describe some of these policies below.12
A. Legislation, Sanctions and Inter-Ethnic Prejudice
Given that state capacity is high, the populace genuinely fears being reported to (and pun-
ished by) the government for harboring inter-ethnic prejudice. Central to this fear is the
adoption of Rwanda Law 18 which defines and criminalizes “genocide ideology.”13 Individu-
als perceived as harboring inter-ethnic prejudice can be arrested and jailed and sometimes
even disappear (Beswick 2010).14 Strict enforcement and social surveillance by an autocratic
government gives the law its teeth. The RPF has offices at the sector level and informants
at the village level. If individuals are perceived to be harboring inter-ethnic prejudice and
are not acting in accordance with the diktats of the office of the NURC, then anything from
blocked access to local cooperatives and government services to harassment and arrest is
possible.
B. Persuasion, Propaganda and Indoctrination
A primary objective of the Rwandan government has been to create a new inclusive Rwandan
identity and to erase the hold of ethnic identity.15 This is considered one of the government’s
top priorities. Its importance can be gleaned from a senior government official’s statement
12This discussion draws on Thomson (2011b), who provides an excellent overview of the variety of measures
adopted by the government as part of this ostensible nation building exercise.
13Article 2 defines genocide ideology as “an aggregate of thoughts characterized by conduct, speeches,
documents and other acts aiming at exterminating or inciting others to exterminate people basing on ethnic
group, origin, nationality, region, color, physical appearance, sex, language, religion or political opinion,
committed in normal periods or during war.”
14Part of the fear stems from an arbitrary aspect of the law itself. For instance (Article 3) of the law says an
individual can be accused of the crime of “genocide ideology” for “ (1). threatening, intimidating, degrading
through defamatory speeches, documents or actions that aim at propounding wickedness or inciting hatred;
(2). marginalizing, laughing at one’s misfortune, defaming, mocking boasting, despising, degrading, creating
confusion aiming at negating the genocide which occurred, stirring up ill feelings, taking revenge, altering
testimony or evidence for the genocide which occurred.”
15As Kagame asked rhetorically in his speech at the 20th Commemoration of the Genocide “...if we succeed
in forging a new, more inclusive national identity, would it be a bad thing?”
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(quoted in Thomson (2011b), p. 114) that “We are no longer Hutu, Tutsi or Twa – we
are Rwandans.” The regime plays a crucial role in emphasizing “the unifying aspects of
Rwandan history, such as our shared culture and language and de-emphasizing divisive ones
in all activities in the public sphere,” the same official said. Kagame’s government has
attempted to change inter-ethnic preferences through a package of measures including direct
indoctrination through the media, the rewriting of ethnic, colonial and genocide history in
school textbooks, as well as the enforced social interaction and solidarity building through
programs such as Itorero (civic education) or Umuganda (community building projects).
Consistent with this package of policies, the government has made the mere mention of
ethnicity illegal in public discourse and has discontinued the usage of ethnic terms in the
census.
Umuganda employs an unusual, compulsory rule: individuals from all ethnicities are re-
quired to get together once a month to collectively work on a project for the public good.
The explicit objective has less to do with simply completing a project and more to do with
“bringing together people living together in the same community” (Lawrence and Uwim-
babazi 2013). This has been accompanied by a deliberate attempt to rewrite Rwandan
history in re-education camps (Ingando) as well as (more recently) in primary school text-
books.16
Reporters Without Borders ranks Rwanda as one of the worst countries in the world
in regard to freedom of the media, and the World Press Freedom Index ranks it 161st out
of 179 countries. Any criticism of the government (especially with regard to Hutu-Tutsi
relationships) has been dealt with severely, with reporters and newspapers such as Umuseso
and Umuco being prosecuted under the Rwandan ethnic divisionism law. According to the
2010 Commonwealth Observer Report, “the media environment is characterized...by a culture
16For instance, Mgbako (2005) (p. 218) reports an interview with a former Ingando student who argued
that “the colonialists brought these ideas so that they could strengthen their politics...What difference does
it make whether you have a thin nose or a flat nose? After Ingando I identify only as Rwandan.” Similarly,
the Financial Times (06/14/2014) reported that recently textbooks have been rewritten to reflect the view
that “the Hutu/Tutsi distinction is considered an invention of Belgian colonial rule.”
11
of self-censorship, with high levels of reluctance by journalists to write reports criticizing the
government, its policies or their implementation.”
Radio is by far the “most important form of mass media in Rwanda” (Paluck 2009),
and in rural areas, it often offers the only vehicle for news and information. However, radio
broadcasting in Rwanda is limited in terms of its reach, programming, and point of view.
Despite the presence of many transmission towers, the country’s hilly topography means
that radio coverage is quite patchy. Furthermore, despite the proliferation of radio stations
in Rwanda over the past decade, the broadcast of news and information is largely confined
to Radio Rwanda - the official radio station (Fre`re 2009). This is not just because Radio
Rwanda has the widest geographic coverage, but also because widespread self-censorship has
resulted in the other private radio stations focusing on entertainment programming.
Radio Rwanda is regarded as an instrument of state policy. For example, Waldorf (2007)
quotes the Rwandan minister for information as saying, “the public radio and television are
there for relaying the action of the government. The private media, rather, should be inter-
ested in other things, like music and entertainment.”17 Indeed, Rwandan government officials
believe that radio has been so successful in promoting national unity and reconciliation that
they now advocate using it to promote other aims, such as economic development.18 In-
dependent research has also confirmed the effectiveness of specific programs broadcast (e.g.
evidence of the effectiveness of Musekewya (New Dawn)) on Radio Rwanda (Paluck 2009;
Paluck and Green 2009).
We also collected independent information about the content broadcast by Radio Rwanda
as well as other stations.19 This simple exercise suggests that treating Radio Rwanda as
17This view is echoed by Fre`re (2013), who reports that “several radio monitoring projects (around the
2003, 2008 and 2010 elections) have demonstrated that the national radio station was blatantly imbalanced
in its coverage of the RPF and its candidates.”
18For instance, the director of Radio Rwanda said that radio has become “the real mass media for the
people of Rwanda,” and that “the ability of radio to unite people has to be leveraged to improve their
well-being.” Source: The New Times http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-02-16/186027
19We hired a Kinyarwanda-speaking research assistant to listen to radio over a four-week period, and to
code over 50 hours of radio broadcasts in Rwanda. The research assistant, a Tutsi, had some flexibility to
choose the times during which he listened to any given station. However, the research assistant was informed
only that the project was about the radio sector in Rwanda, and, thus was unaware of the project’s purpose.
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Kagame’s station is justified since it broadcasts news that is overwhelmingly in favor of
the government, and helps to emphasize a new Rwandan identity instead of a tribal/ethnic
identity (see figures A1 and A2). We find that Radio Rwanda is over 5 times more likely
than private radio to discuss national identity positively, and accounts for nearly 83 percent
of pro-government content even though it is only 61 percent of the content we sampled.
III. Experimental Protocol
In 2013-14 we collected and processed data from lab-in-the-field experiments and an asso-
ciated survey that included 438 farmers from 52 collines (villages) in rural Rwanda (figure
1).20 A team of eight Rwandan enumerators and a field manager conducted the survey and
experiments in Rwanda. The enumerators were informed that the experiments were part of
a study examining working conditions, cooperation and contracts in the agricultural sector
(Blouin 2016). We chose villages on the basis of two criteria. The first criterion was the
geographic suitability of the land for coffee production, which is a proxy for whether the
village had a history of forced labor (Blouin 2016). The second criterion was whether the
village was eligible for FARG, a government-initiated fund targeted to Tutsi survivors, and
for which only Tutsi are eligible. FARG villages were selected in order to be able to differen-
tiate between Hutu and Tutsi in the sample, without violating any government rules about
directly asking individuals about their ethnicity.
The project was reviewed by both the University of Warwick Ethics Committee and the
Rwandan government. Before we engaged in any pilots related to the project, we submitted
our survey materials, experimental protocol, schedule and budget as well as other documents
related to the project to the Rwandan government. These materials included a summary
He was instructed to listen to 30-minute segments for between two and three hours of radio per day, five
days per week. Given the importance and ‘reach’ of Radio Rwanda, the research assistant spent 47.5% of his
time listening to Radio Rwanda, and the rest of the time he listened to private radio stations. These include
the following: FlashFM, Ikondera Info, Imbaraga FM, Ingando Star, Itahuka Radio, KT Radio, MagicFM,
Radio 10, TR Rwanda
20Colline is the administrative term used to refer to a village in Rwanda. We also conducted data collection
in Burundi. We do not use these data in the body of the paper but discuss their collection in the appendix.
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of the proposed research project referred to above. The Rwandan Government gave us
approval and provided our field team with a document granting us permission to conduct
surveys in the districts that we had outlined. On completion of the research project, the
government requested that we supply it a copy of our research findings (we did this in late
2013 and provided them with a preliminary version of Blouin (2016)). Prior to starting our
work in a district our field manager typically had to review the document with a political
or administrative representative from the district. They received a broad overview of the
project (i.e. that we were studying attitudes and cooperation in the agricultural sector in
rural Rwanda) and also informed that the project had been reviewed and approved by the
Rwandan Government.
Prior to our arrival at each village, our field manager selected subjects randomly from a
list of potential subjects made available by the political representative of the village.21 All
individuals who agreed to participate in the experiment were promised compensation equal
to about half a day’s average wage, and after being compensated for the various incentive-
compatible tasks they typically earned more than a day’s average wage. Not surprisingly, in
the vast majority of villages we surveyed, everybody participated. In the few villages where
some opted not to take part in the experiment, almost 90 percent of those selected agreed
to participate. The survey and experiments were conducted in a community hall located in
the district, and all subjects were provided free transportation to get them to and from the
survey location. The total time taken for a subject to complete the experiments and survey
was less than half a day.
In each case, our team of enumerators arrived at the survey site in four SUVs. While
our team prepared materials for the experiment and survey, each vehicle picked up subjects
21One concern may be that exposure to Radio Rwanda, influenced the village representative’s selection of
subjects directly. We check for this in table A1, which looks at the effect of radio on the difference between
characteristics of our sample and the average of those characteristics based on the last census. For ethnicity,
we use the 1991 census. This exercise comes with the caveat that due to the genocide the ethnic makeup of
any village in 1991 may be different than it is now. While one of the estimates is significant at the 10% level,
we generally do not find much evidence to suggest that differential selection took place in Radio Rwanda
regions.
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from an agreed-upon location from four different regions of the district, and they were driven
to a community hall in one of the villages to conduct the experiment. In some cases, we
also selected subjects who lived in the same village where this community hall was located.
Therefore, in any given data-collection session we gathered information from participants
from four or five different villages.
As subjects arrived at the community hall, the enumerator handed them the consent
document that also described the purpose of the study. This document was either read to
them by the enumerator or (if they preferred) could be read by themselves.22 Once they had
agreed to participate, all subjects were given an I.D. tag, consisting of a letter and a number.
The letter denoted the region that the subject was picked up from (ranging from A to E if
subjects from five regions were at the session), and the number was a unique within-region
identifier ranging from one to seven. The I.D. tags, which were assigned to each subject and
pinned to his or her shirt, were randomly picked out of a bag by the enumerator. These
I.D. cards were the basis for assignment of partnerships and treatments in the various lab
experiments. People of the same letter were never matched together, but otherwise, ID tags
were randomly matched to form partnerships.
We describe additional details of the protocol in the supplementary online appendix.
IV. Data
Once subjects entered the community hall they participated in a battery of lab-in-the-field
experiments and an associated survey. For each subject we collected inter-ethnic attitudes
using a measure of ethnic salience, a partner selection measure, two survey questions on
trust, and data from the trust game, which we match to GIS data on radio signal. Summary
statistics for each of the outcomes appear in table 1, panel B. Unconditional correlations
between the main measures used throughout the analysis can be seen in table A2. We will
discuss each in turn.
22All subjects were informed that the study was interested in assessing cooperation and work in rural
Rwanda in the agricultural sector.
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A. Measurement of Inter-Ethnic Attitudes
i) Salience of Identity Test (SIT): We are interested in measuring how individuals men-
tally categorize others. Taylor et al. (1978) and Taylor and Fiske (1978) argued that such
categorization is a fundamental aspect of social cognition in complex environments.23 They
developed a test to assess whether individuals categorize on a dimension of interest, such as
race or gender. We adapted their test for the Rwandan context.24
The enumerator randomly arranged eight photographs on a table. The photographs were
of eight males and included four Hutu and four Tutsi (see figure 2 for an illustration). In
the first phase of the experiment, all subjects were asked to pay attention while the enumer-
ator picked up a particular photograph and read a neutral statement about the individual
depicted in that photograph.25 After reading the statement, the enumerator placed the pho-
tograph back on the table and picked up the next photograph and again, read the associated
paired statement. This process was repeated for all eight photographs. This first phase
of the experiment took approximately three minutes. After a break of a few minutes, the
enumerator implemented the second phase of the experiment. In this phase, each subject
was informed that there was a surprise recall task. In particular, the enumerator informed
subjects that one of the statements that had been read in the first phase would be read
back to them. The subject had then to match it with the appropriate photograph. If the
subject was unsure about the photograph associated with a statement, they were asked to
take their best guess. The subjects were informed that each correct pairing of the statement
to a photograph would be rewarded at the rate of 100RWF.
Typically, subjects matched some statements and photographs correctly, and also made
errors. The key issue for our research stemmed from the errors. In particular, we examined
23The original Taylor et al. (1978) experiment was used to study whether individuals encode race. The
importance of such categorization for social cognition has been further explored by Stangor et al. (1992) and
Kurzban et al. (2001).
24Any such categorization presumes that there are discernible physical/genetic differences between the
Hutu and the Tutsi. We discuss at some length in Section IV.C.
25As an example of one of a neutral statement: “This person likes to go for long walks.”
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whether or not subjects were more likely to confuse one ethnicity for another. For example,
suppose an individual in the recall phase of the experiment matched a statement that was
paired with the photo of a Tutsi to the wrong photograph. If a subject more frequently
misattributed the statements associated with a Tutsi to another Tutsi, then according to
our measure, ethnicity was more salient for that subject. That is, plausibly, more within-
ethnicity errors are correlated with the salience of ethnicity. We measure ethnic salience for
a given subject by dividing the subject’s total number of within-ethnicity errors by her total
number of errors, thus normalizing for variation across subjects in the overall error rate.26
In practice, all subjects made at least one error, so this measure was always well-defined.
This particular measure of ethnic salience has several features that are especially valuable
in our context. One is that it is an unobtrusive measure that captures in a simple way how
a subject processes and categorizes information without having to question them about
their ethnicity.27 Another is that instructions are easy for the enumerator to convey. The
experiment does not require subjects to be literate or comfortable with tablets or computers.
A final noteworthy feature is that the elicitation is incentive-compatible.
Note that not all within-ethnicity errors suggest that ethnicity is salient. These errors
arise even if the individual answered randomly. To account for this we define two alternative
measures of ethnic salience. The first attempts to account for the fact that ethnic salience
is more reliably inferred when individuals make a larger number of within-ethnicity errors.
So it may be argued that such individuals should be given more weight. Accordingly, we
also define a quadratic measure of ethnic salience given by the ratio of the square of the
number of within-ethnicity errors to the total number of errors, which we refer to as the
alternative SIT. A final measure relies on the fact that if individuals were simply choosing
26Normalizing for the total number of errors is important because a person may make fewer errors because
of higher mental ability, or due to Taylor et al. (1978)’s observation that an individual “may select salient
social or physical dimensions...for grouping and managing personal information.” In other words, while a
subject for whom ethnicity is more salient is more likely to confuse one Tutsi for another, it is possible that
he will make fewer overall errors because he categorizes by ethnicity.
27This is in contrast to the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald and Banaji 1995), which highlights ethnic
categories.
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photographs randomly, about 42% of their errors would be within-ethnicity. Accordingly, we
also examine a binary variable that is equal to one if people make more than 42% of their
errors within-ethnicity and zero otherwise.
ii) Partner Selection Task: At the end of the survey, all subjects engaged in a partner
selection task (similar to Rao (2015)). All subjects were informed that they had to select
five individuals with whom they would prefer to engage in a cooperative task that required
them to spend time with the selected person. They chose from the set of twenty individuals
at the session, with the caveat that they could not choose anyone they knew or anyone that
lived nearby (as denoted by the letter on their ID tag).28 Subjects chose prospective partners
on the basis of looking around the room and at the ID tags of others at the session. So
this selection may have been on the basis of observable characteristics such as (among other
things) gender, clothing, height, age, and ethnicity. We ensured that these partner selections
were incentive compatible by informing subjects that two of them (from each session of 20)
would be chosen to be partnered with one of their choices in a separate unrelated task.29
We construct three measures of willingness to socially interact with those of a different
ethnicity. Our main measure is given by:
Preference for inter-ethnic partner =
number of choices from other ethnic group
min{5, total other ethnic group} . (1)
Here the numerator is simply a count of the number of choices that are from the other ethnic
group. The denominator accounts for the fact that in some sessions, for example, a Hutu has
the option of choosing five Tutsi, while in some other sessions fewer Tutsi may be available.
We also experiment with an alternative measure that replaces the numerator in equation (1)
28The survey question outlined to participants that in a specific task (they were told the last one of the
day, so they knew which task it was) some participants would be chosen to partner with someone on their
list, and that the nature of the task was such that if they could not co-operate well with their choice that
they may earn less money. They did not know that their choices themselves were part of the data collection
effort, from their perspective the choices were an intermediary step for the completion of another task.
29The other task was used to collect data for an unrelated project. Controlling for whether subjects were
selected to be matched to their choices in this unrelated task did not affect any of our results (table A3).
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with its square and a third measure that is a function of only the numerator.
iii) Trust Survey Questions As part of the survey, subjects answered two questions about
trust. Given government-imposed restrictions, we were unable to directly ask about inter-
ethnic trust. As a substitute we asked individuals about trust of people from their own
community and about trust of people from the other community. Specifically the questions
ask: “How much do you trust people from other communities in your village” and “How
much you trust people from your own community in your village?” where responses were on
a four-point scale (i.e. Not at all/Just a little/Somewhat/A lot).
We stress that this variable should be interpreted with caution for several reasons. First,
we do not know how subjects interpreted the word community. Some may have considered
it to mean family and friends; others as colleagues or other members of their cooperative;
and others still, may have interpreted it as an ethnic group. Second, the ethnic make-up of
the community can itself be affected by inter-ethnic attitudes in the first place. Finally, even
if subjects, for the most part, did interpret the question as a veiled question about ethnic
preferences, we still have to consider the possibility that people in Radio Rwanda-receiving
villages just know what they are supposed to say. In other words, one possibility is that
people in Radio Rwanda’s broadcast regions are more sensitive to appearing as though they
favor equality, and respond accordingly when asked about it directly.
iv) Trust Game We also had all subjects play a face-to-face, one-shot trust game. An
enumerator used a dice roll to randomly assign all subjects to play either the private or
the public version of the trust game. The primary difference between the two treatments
was that in the public version of the game a decision made in the game would be written
on a poster board where other subjects at the session could see how they played. One of
the enumerators was tasked with ensuring this took place throughout the day. The aim of
the public version was to examine whether fear of being identified as having low trust may
influence behavior (especially in inter-ethnic relationships). For instance, if a subject fears
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that choosing an action may be disapproved of by her community or the local government
(which is plausible given the presence of informants), then she may choose to cooperate and
make a high-trust offer.30 In every case an enumerator ensured that all partners were not
only drawn from different villages, but also had never met.31 In the private information
treatment, the enumerator informed the two subjects that decisions made by the two of
them in the game would be kept confidential and not publicly announced by being written
on the poster board as in some of the other games.
One participant was randomly designated as player 1 (the sender) and the other was
player 2 (the receiver). The sequence of moves was described to both of them, prior to the
implementation of the game. Player 1 was given an endowment of approximately a day’s
wage, or 600RWF and was instructed to transfer as much as (s)he wanted to player 2 and
keep the rest. The enumerator matched the amount transferred and then Player 2 chose to
keep as much as (s)he wanted and transferred the rest to Player 1. We examine whether or
not subjects in villages receiving a Radio Rwanda signal make higher trust game offers in
the private trust game when interacting with a person of another ethnicity.
One important caveat is that the trust game may capture things other than trust. For
example, the trust game may measure other-regarding preferences (Cox 2004; Ashraf et al.
2006); the actual trustworthiness of the receiver (rather than perceived trustworthiness);
or preferences towards risk (Karlan 2005; Schechter 2007). We attempt to address these
confounds in various ways, such as by examining return offers as a proxy for other-regarding
preferences and by including controls for risk preference in our analysis. We stress, however,
that if these factors are affected by receipt of Radio Rwanda, they may explain a portion of
the effects we attribute to trust.
30Despite a large literature on trust games, surveyed in Sapienza et al. (2013) and Johnson and Mislin
(2011), we are not aware of any literature on the public version of the trust game as described by us
here. However, a literature that explores third-party punishment closely relates to our work. For example,
Balafoutas et al. (2014) show that about 35% of third parties in a one-shot trust game are willing to punish
low trust offers despite having no strategic incentive to do so. Charness et al. (2008) show that the threat
of third party punishment makes trust game offers 60% larger, a much larger effect than what we find.
31They were both asked independently if they had ever met their partner prior to being designated as
partners.
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At the time that subjects were randomly matched to others at their session to play the
trust game, we had not yet inferred their ethnicities. Therefore, some of these subjects
randomly found themselves playing the trust game with a co-ethnic partner and others with
an inter-ethnic partner.
B. Validity of the SIT
The SIT measure, while new to the economics literature, has been extensively used in cog-
nitive psychology. The first application is from Taylor and Fiske (1978) who show that
some features about an individual’s recall are facilitated by the encoding of features that are
salient. This idea was further explored by Stangor et al. (1992) who examined conditions
under which race or sex was salient. A more recent application is Kurzban et al. (2001)
who show that when shirt colour is made a more salient feature of group membership, race
becomes less salient.
We want to ensure that our measure of ethnic salience is associated with measures of
actual behavior. For instance, individuals with lower ethnic salience should be expected
to display similar levels of trust toward those of the other ethnicity as they do toward
members of their own group. In other words, we should expect people with lower levels
of ethnic salience to make higher offers in inter-ethnic matches of the private trust game.
This is indeed what table A4, panel A reveals. Columns 1 and 3 show that individuals for
whom ethnicity is salient (i.e. high SIT scores) are those that make lower offers in private
information inter-ethnic trust games. Similarly, columns 2 and 4 illustrate the fact that, as
expected, ethnic salience is not associated with differences in co-ethnic behavior in the same
way as inter-ethnic behavior.
The dynamic is different in public game trust offers (table A4, panel B). Here we observe
that there is no clear difference between the co-ethnic and inter-ethnic offers between people
with high and low ethnic salience. Furthermore, people with high ethnic salience seem more
sensitive to public information in the inter-ethnic games (see the Equality of Coefficients:
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Private - Public (p-value) in panel B).
C. Ethnicity and the Collection of Data
In Rwanda, it is not feasible (or permissible) to directly ask individuals their ethnicity. The
key to resolving this challenge was our discovery that information on ethnicity could be
indirectly inferred by using income surveys that ask subjects their sources of income. In
particular, individuals in Rwanda may receive funds from the government under a variety of
different programs, including the FARG program. However, the FARG program is exclusively
available to survivors (as defined by the government) of the 1994 genocide - a category that
coincides almost perfectly with the Tutsi wherever FARG gives money.32 Not only is the
Rwandan government very strict about the criteria for FARG eligibility, it has also defined
the term survivors in a political way such that it coincides with the Tutsi ethnicity and
excludes any Hutu who died during the genocide.
For example, article 3 of the law establishing FARG outlines Definitions of terms, and
specifically defines survivors as “survivors of the Genocide against the Tutsi” while Fund
is specifically defined as “Fund for the support and assistance to the Tutsi survivors of
the genocide” (Law No. 69/2008 of 30/12/2008).33 Crucially, eligibility hinges entirely on
being a “survivor.”34 This singular eligibility criterion (given locality) is especially impor-
tant because the word “survivor” is both officially interpreted and commonly understood as
“Tutsi”. Similarly the word “ge´nocidaire” is officially interpreted and commonly understood
32Accordingly, we asked participants in Rwanda their sources of income from various aid programs (in-
cluding FARG). For each aid program they were asked whether they were (a) eligible for it, and (b) received
money from it. In order to make the question on FARG eligibility less salient, the section about FARG
eligibility was part of a subsection about income sources from government funds, which in turn was part of
a larger income module.
33 International human rights agencies define someone as a victim of the genocide (and hence family mem-
bers are genocide survivors) if they died in Rwanda due to violence between April 7th and July 15th, 1994,
regardless of ethnicity. However, under the Rwandan government definition, only Tutsi can be considered
genocide victims. The genocide has been relabeled as the “genocide against the Tutsi” (Ferstman et al.
2009).
34see: http://socialprotection.org/programme/genocide-survivors-support-and-assistance-fund-farg
(last accessed November 6th 2017), which lists the only eligibility criterion being “...that she or he is a
genocide survivor.”
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as “Hutu” (Thomson 2011b, p. 111). The implication of this is that those Tutsi still alive
are eligible for FARG even if they were not directly impacted by the genocide.
Our inability to even mention or otherwise identify an individual’s ethnicity raises the
question of whether the subjects in our experiments know each other’s ethnicity by physical
appearance alone - particularly given that the people are drawn from different villages and
have never met each other.
As documented by a number of genetic studies, there are clear genetic differences between
the Hutu and the Tutsi, with the latter having many more Nilo-Saharan markers (Luis et al.
2004; Shepard and Herrera 2006). Of course, it is possible that genetic differences may not
manifest themselves into discernible physical characteristics. Nevertheless, as described by
Gourevitch (1998) (p.50) “nobody can dispute the physical archetypes: for Hutu, stocky
and round-faced, dark-skinned and flat nosed, thick lipped and square-jawed; for Tutsi,
lanky and long-faced, not so dark-skinned, narrow-nosed, thin-lipped and narrow-chinned.”
While these stereotypical physical characteristics do exist, there are also (as pointed out by
Gourevitch (1998) and others) likely to be many exceptions of individuals who are not easy
to classify neatly into these ethnic categories. This suggests that misattribution of someone’s
ethnicity is possible. In section VII.B, we further investigate this issue when we examine the
robustness of the results.
D. Radio Signal and the Radio Listenership Survey
Given Rwanda’s mountainous topography, we exploit local variation in the reception of
government radio broadcasts (as in Yanagizawa-Drott (2014)). Indeed, this mountainous
topography is such that despite the presence of 27 radio transmission towers (see table A5),
there exist many pockets of rural Rwanda that do not receive a good signal - as illustrated in
figure 3. Our main identification strategy compares regions within districts of Rwanda that
do receive a good quality Radio Rwanda signal, with those that do not. This heterogeneity
is such that even relatively small administrative units (such as districts) usually contain
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villages both with and without a good radio signal. Indeed, the empirical exercise relies on
differences in inter-ethnic behavior between precisely these villages.
Using radio tower location and topographical information, we calculate whether or not
a village received a radio signal. The signal strength data are calculated using the ITM
(Irregular Terrain Model) based on radio transmitter location, frequency, and power from
FMScan.org. We match signal strength in each village to the villages of each subject, which
are acquired from the survey. We compute signal strength in db/µ and compute a binary
variable indicating whether a village gets reception if the signal strength in that village is
at least 45db/µ (Figueiras and Frattasi 2010).35 This threshold is based on audible radio
reception using a low-quality receiver as would be typically found in Rwanda. We will
examine robustness to alternative thresholds.
We corroborate our radio signal measure with actual radio ownership and listenership
patterns across regions exposed to Radio Rwanda broadcasts and not exposed. These data
come from two sources: the first is based on a follow-up survey of a subset of our subjects,
completed by April 2017; and the second is from the Rwandan DHS survey, conducted in
2014. The follow-up survey provides us with a measure of signal strength at a subject’s
home (the measure ranges from 3-9 in the data); as well as whether the subject regularly
listens to Radio Rwanda, or any other station.36 The DHS data include a question on radio
ownership and has the advantage of being nationally representative.
35This is consistent with the methodology described in Hoeg and Lauterbach (2004) who argue that if the
coverage in a location is at least 46db/u then we should expect 99% of the area in the 1km2 radius to have
30+ signal strength (p. 248). A detailed description of how we match our village locations to radio signals
can be found in Appendix C.
36 The follow-up survey was conducted over the phone. Hence it automatically constrained our sample to
the subset of participants who had an assigned cell phone number in 2013 - which need not be representative
of the broader population. For example, in 2010 Bjorkegren (2015) reports that 84% of mobile phone owners
owned a radio while only 63% of the general population did. Furthermore, perhaps due to changes in the
media landscape as well as the entry of new cell phone providers, there has been attrition in our original
sample of cell phone users. MTN is the dominant company, but one major player lost its license just before
we arrived, and Tigo, a newer entrant has gained substantial market share since we were last there. On
the other hand, Stork and Stork (2008) completed a representative survey of Rwanda and report the mean
number of hours per day listening to the radio in rural areas is 4.37 while in our data it is 4.16. At least
based on this narrow measure, data from our survey seems somewhat similar. We end up with 154 subjects
for our follow-up survey, drawn from 48 villages.
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We used this survey on radio listenership to evaluate alternative definitions of radio
reception at the village level. The resolution of the radio signal data is quite high, so within
any village we typically observe radio signals for three to five geographic pixels.37 Given
this, we consider four ways to measure whether or not a village received a signal from a
radio station (denoted i, ii, iii, iv). A first option (i) is to take the fraction of pixels that we
believe receives a signal. This would provide us with the share of coverage within a village,
so that the higher the share, the more likely it is for anyone in the village to be able to
listen from home. A second approach is to construct a binary measure that equals one if a
certain threshold of pixels within the village receives a signal. Here there are three distinct
thresholds that we evaluate. These include (ii) whether a simple majority (i.e. > 50%) or
(iii) a large majority (e.g. > 75%) of pixels within the village receive a signal. Finally, we
also evaluate (iv) whether the threshold should be > 20%. Since there are between 3 and 5
pixels per village this captures whether any one pixel receives a signal. This latter definition
is attractive since it might capture informational spillovers in communities with thick social
networks. This is a crucial consideration, especially since it is quite common for people to
seek out a place to listen, say at the homes of friends or family. As many as 20% of people in
Rwanda primarily listen to radio outside of their home (Stork and Stork 2008). Furthermore,
in that data, 28% of people report not owning a radio, but 99.9% report listening to radio
regularly.
We check each of these four definitions of village level reception, using various different
radio thresholds to see which is most relevant in terms of actual listening habits. First, we
find that across all of our methods of assigning a signal to a village, 45db/µ is the most
relevant threshold. Table A6 shows that this threshold provides the largest estimate when
we regress listening regularity on village reception, regardless of how reception is defined (i.e.
in each of the four panels). Of the four methods of assigning reception to a village (fraction
of village receiving a signal; thresholds at > 20%, > 50%, > 75%) the two that seem most
37Our data provides us with coordinates for the centre of each village, and around each, we draw a circle
with radius of approximately 2km to mark approximate village boundaries.
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relevant are the threshold at 20% and the fraction of the village receiving a signal. In both
of these cases there is a significant effect of reception on listening at both the 45 and 50 db/µ
thresholds, with the 45 threshold being more precise in each case. For our main results we
opt for the former (threshold of > 20%) because of the reported prevalence of Rwandans
seeking-out a signal away from home. However, our results are also robust to using the
fraction of pixels in a village receiving a signal, as we show in table A7.
V. Empirical Strategy
We are interested in examining the impact on inter-ethnic trust and ethnic salience of living
in a region that is exposed to propaganda from Radio Rwanda. By the end of 2013, there
were 27 radio transmission towers (mostly built recently) that broadcast Radio Rwanda.
Given the topography, this resulted in radio coverage of about 48 percent of our sample
(table 1, panel A).
A. Main Specification
We employ two main strategies to investigate differences in inter-ethnic attitudes between
those living in villages that do and do not receive Radio Rwanda. For the first strategy, which
we use for the SIT and partner selection measures, we simply regress these outcomes on a
dummy variable indicating whether the subject’s village is able to receive a Radio Rwanda
signal. For the second strategy, which we use for the trust measures, we separately regress
inter-ethnic and co-ethnic trust on an indicator for receipt of Radio Rwanda, and test the
equality of the coefficients between the two trust outcomes. More formally, we implement
the following two main tests:
φivd = β0 + αd + β1RadioRwandavd + Γ
′Xivd + ivd (2)
26
and
Inter-Ethnic Trustivd = λ0 + κd + λ1RadioRwandavd + Ω
′Xivd + υivd (3)
Co-Ethnic Trustivd = ρ0 + ωd + ρ1RadioRwandavd + Θ
′Xivd + εivd
H0 : λ1 − ρ1 = 0
Here subscripts i, v and d denote an individual, village and district respectively. In equation
(2) φivd is a generic outcome that can be either the SIT score of the individual or the
partner-selection variable. αd denotes district fixed-effects; we have data on individuals from
eight different districts and 52 different villages. RadioRwandavd is a binary variable that
indicates that the subject’s village receives a signal of greater than 45db/µ and Xivd is a
vector of controls.
We have controls that vary at either the individual or the village level. At the individual
level, there is information on gender, age, our proxy for ethnicity, an aptitude test score
(the Raven test), education, income (which we include the logarithm of), and enumerator
fixed-effects.38 At the village level, controls are included for whether the village historically
received an RTLM signal (the signal for the hate radio station that incited genocide violence);
the light density in the village at night;39 the distance to Kigali, to the nearest road, and to
the nearest major city; the level of genocide violence; the elevation of the village; the variance
in elevation of the village’s sector; the ethnic composition; and indicators for whether the
village faced north, south, east, or west. Additionally, since identification should rely only
on the variation of the topography of Rwanda, variables for the Euclidian distance to the
nearest three Radio Rwanda towers are included, as well as variables for the travel-time to
38One concern could be whether the identity of the enumerators affects how subjects behave in the various
experiments. To deal with this concern, enumerator fixed effects appear in all of the empirical specifications.
However, adding these enumerator fixed effects make little difference to any of the estimates (table A26).
39This may capture local income but may also capture proximity to a nearby city. Both may indicate
economic activity which may be associated with increased inter-ethnic encounters, we are agnostic about
specifically how. In any event, the results do not differ substantially without this control (table A8).
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the nearest three towers.40 The conditional correlations between all of our controls and all
of our outcomes in villages with and without Radio Rwanda can be seen in table A9.
We use the same set of controls in equation (3), which examines co-ethnic and inter-ethnic
trust as outcomes. Here we have two measures of both inter-ethnic as well as co-ethnic trust.
The first measure draws on responses to the trust survey questions, and the second measure
is given by offers made in the trust game. For the trust game specifications, we include an
additional set of controls for the experimental conditions. These controls include the gender
of the assigned partner, an indicator for whether the partner also lives in a village that
receives Radio Rwanda, as well as the distance between villages of the sender and receiver
in the trust game. We also include the trust-game enumerator fixed effects.41 In addition,
we had a risk preference measure to control for the fact that risk preferences can confound
the trust-based interpretation of trust game offers (Sapienza et al. 2013).42 In principle,
none of our subjects should know where other participants in the experiment came from,
since we disallowed communication between subjects from different villages.43 Nevertheless,
we control for these regional characteristics in case there are non-verbal cues that indicate
regional differences.
Our hypothesis is that in equation (2) β1 < 0 for the SIT measure and β1 > 0 for the
partner-selection task measure. In equation (3) we expect that λ1 > 0 but that ρ1 ≈ 0, so
we test for the equality of λ1 and ρ1.
In the trust game, we have two types of inter-ethnic trust, public and private trust. When
we use the trust-game data to estimate equation (3) we further split the sample according
40Travel time is computed by scraping Google Maps using Python. For this we went through the Google
Maps API.
41We do not have enumerator fixed effects for the partner selection task and the SIT, since everyone had
the same enumerator for these tasks.
42 Sapienza et al. (2013) point out that other regarding preferences can confound trust game estimates. In
our context, however, we do not see that as inconsistent with the main hypothesis, which is that Hutu-Tutsi
relations are better in villages that receive Radio Rwanda. Given our broader focus on nation building and
inter-ethnic attitudes, rather than exclusively on trust per se, whether the improvement is due to trust or
altruism is a secondary concern.
43Participants from the same region arrived together in the same SUV, but these people were not allowed
to partner with each other.
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to whether the subject played the public or private version of the trust game. Here, ex-
ante we thought both an increase in public and private trust were plausible. Both were
measured with the aim of observing whether differences in inter-ethnic behavior were due
to differences in fear of having one’s mistrust exposed (public trust game), or due to actual
differences in attitudes, beliefs or preferences (private trust game). Of course, from the
subject’s perspective, even in the private game there is some risk that the information will
be made public. We assume that the perceived probability of the trust offer being made
public is higher in the public trust game.
B. Identifying Assumptions
An important assumption for our analysis is that those living in villages receiving a Radio
Rwanda signal are more likely to listen to Radio Rwanda. Here the data on radio ownership
and the follow-up survey on listenership patterns provide a consistent picture. We present
the results in table 2, panel A. We find that individuals located in the catchment area of
Radio Rwanda are more likely to own a radio, much more likely to receive a high-quality
radio signal, and 40% more likely to listen to Radio Rwanda regularly. Our follow-up survey
also reveals that all but one of our 154 subjects consider Radio Rwanda a credible source of
news and information.
A second assumption is that access to Radio Rwanda is not correlated, conditional on our
controls, with other determinants of the outcomes that we study. Our identification strategy
relies on idiosyncratic variation in access to radio transmission due to the topography. Given
that radio transmission is affected by (poorly understood) fluctuations in temperature, air
pressure, rainfall and humidity (Luomala and Hakala 2015), any targeting would likely occur
at a broader level than the village. This is why we control for district fixed effects throughout
our analysis.44
44We also show that our main results are robust to a model with fewer controls but with sector fixed effects
instead of district fixed effects. While we lose degrees of freedom in the model with full-controls and sector
fixed-effects, the sector-level model implicitly controls for most of the geographic variation due to the fact
that sectors in Rwanda are so small. For these results, see table A11.
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Our main balancing test includes district fixed effects as well as distance to the nearest
big city, road, and Kigali. These results - for both Radio Rwanda reception and assignment
to the public treatment - are found in table 2, panels B-D. In each row, we test whether
radio reception or the public treatment explains various different variables that may have the
potential to be relevant for the results. Panel B examines the baseline control variables,45
while panel C examines the full controls, and panel D shows balancing on other variables
of interest. In panels B and C we find that reception of RTLM and the religious radio
station Maria-Nyina wa Zombo, as well as distance to Kigali predict Radio Rwanda signal,
while RTLM, north facing and south facing villages seem to predict assignment to the public
treatment.
In panel D we investigate other stations and colonial history (because they are used in
our robustness exercises), and migration (because it is a potential confound).46 None of
these estimates are statistically distinguishable from zero either for Radio Rwanda or for
assignment to the public trust game. Overall, we test balancing with 66 different estimates
and find only six that are statistically different from zero at the 10% level (three each for
Radio Rwanda and the public treatment).
VI. Results
A. Erasing Ethnicity: The Salience of Identity Test
We begin by examining the relationship between Radio Rwanda and the measure for the
salience of ethnic identity (SIT). Differences in the salience of ethnicity by Radio Rwanda
reception can be seen in table 3 and figure 4.
Columns 1-3 of table 3 show that SIT scores are lower in Radio Rwanda villages, under
different specifications. Column 1 presents estimates from a regression using the baseline
45All baseline control variables are included with the exception of the distance to tower variables, which
are mechanically correlated with signal strength.
46Note that Radio Rwanda only began focusing on the new-Rwanda identity when Kagame took political
control just over a decade ago. Since that time, only 3.7% of the subjects in our sample have migrated (table
1).
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specification, which includes all of the controls listed in table 1 panel C. It suggests that
people from villages that receive a Radio Rwanda signal, score about 13 percentage points
lower on average than villages without reception, which translates to a difference of about
0.46 standard deviations. This implies that for subjects living in Radio Rwanda villages,
ethnicity is less salient. To further account for the fact that one within-ethnicity error
out of one total error is likely much different than five within-ethnicity errors out of five
total errors,47 in column 2, we add fixed effects for the number of mistakes made, and the
estimate is robust. With additional controls, the estimate again remains similar, at just over
10 percentage points (column 3).
Each of these regressions is based on an assumption that the radio signal is audible if the
village receives a signal strength of more than 45 db/µ, and not otherwise. Of course this
likely varies from day to day, and may also differ based on the quality of the radio owned
by an individual. Indeed, in our follow-up survey, many subjects in regions without Radio
Rwanda indicate that they sometimes receive a radio signal, even if it is inconsistent and
difficult to hear through the static. Since it seems reasonable that a binary measure may
not perfectly capture the heterogeneity in radio reception, we examine robustness of our
results to alternative thresholds of signal strength. These are depicted in figure 4, which
plots estimates for many different thresholds of receiving a radio signal at 1db intervals.48
Consistent with table 3, there is a large and negative effect at the 45db/µ threshold, which
is denoted with a dashed line. There are negative and significant estimates, albeit smaller in
absolute magnitude, surrounding our main estimate, consistent with the fact that the 45db/µ
threshold is not a sharp cut-off.49 Given this consideration, the U-pattern that we observe
is what we should expect if 45db/µ is an appropriate cut-off to consider, and if people in
47For example, see table A12 which suggests that individuals in Radio Rwanda villages may make more
mistakes.
48In the figures we use the baseline set of controls. We present the full set of controls in the online
appendix, figure A3.
49Instead some people are willing to listen even if reception is poor, while others are probably able to
offset part of the effect of poor reception with higher quality radios. Furthermore, the 45db/µ threshold is
meant to capture a location that receives a very consistent signal. Many villages with a lower reception will
still receive Radio Rwanda when the weather is good, for example.
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villages that receive Radio Rwanda do in fact have lower salience of ethnicity. Table A13
also presents estimates showing the robustness (using each of the four main outcomes) to a
continuous measure or radio signal strength.
Columns 4 and 5 present robustness to using our two alternative measures of the salience
of ethnic identity.
B. Ethnicity and the Selection of Partners: the Partner-Selection Task
The partner-selection measure allows us to examine whether living in villages exposed to
radio programming encourages face-to-face inter-ethnic social interaction. Regressions using
this measure are examined in table 4. Columns 1-2 show that subjects in villages that receive
Radio Rwanda are about 15-17 percentage points, or 0.51-0.58 standard deviations, more
likely to request partnering with someone from another ethnic group. The result is robust
to alternative specifications and constructions of the outcome measure. In particular, the
effect is similar using a quadratic measure that gives more weight to people that chose more
partners from the other group (column 3) as well as a simple count of choices from the other
group (column 4). Moreover, it seems unlikely that ethnicity is simply proxying for income
- since in table A14 we do not observe any greater preference for those with higher incomes.
Figure 5 also shows results from the main placebo exercise. The figure plots a wide range of
signal thresholds at 1db intervals. As in the case with the SIT, here, too, we would expect
the largest effects for the signals around 45db/µ. Once again, the estimates generate the
expected inverse-U pattern. The evidence from both table 4 and figure 5 suggest that living
in villages exposed to Radio Rwanda may have played some role in making people more
willing to engage with members of the other ethnic group.
C. Inter-Ethnic Trust (I): Evidence from the Survey
Given the importance of inter-ethnic trust for any form of nation building, we measure inter-
ethnic trust in different ways. First we report results from a survey question that asked
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subjects whether they trusted members of the “other community” in their village. We also
asked about members of a subject’s own community, with the hypothesis that only out-group
trust might be higher in villages that receive a Radio Rwanda signal.
Estimates based on these two survey measures can be seen in table 5. The model with
the baseline set of controls can be seen in columns 1 and 2, and the full set in columns 3 and
4. Columns 1 and 3 show out-community trust, while columns 2 and 4 show in-community
trust. The hypothesized out-group effect seems plausible, as the out-group trust estimates
are both much larger than their in-group counterparts, and are the only estimates that are
statistically different from zero. The estimate on out-group trust is about 0.25 of a point
on a four-point Likert scale, or about 0.35 standard deviations. This essentially closes the
gap in trust between the in-group and out-group (control group means are 3.17 and 2.92
respectively for a difference of 0.25). However, perhaps more relevant is whether the out-
group estimate is statistically different from the in-group estimate. Accordingly, the table
also reports the p-value that tests for the equality of the coefficients in columns 1 and 2,
as well as the equality of the estimates in 3 and 4. With the baseline set of controls one is
able to reject equality of the coefficients at the ten percent level (p = 0.068) and there is a
significant difference with the full set of controls at the 1 percent level (p = 0.005).
However, observe that the placebo tests do not provide as much confidence regarding
this measure as they did for the previous two measures. Figure 6, shows estimates from
regressions defining radio reception at different signal strength thresholds. Observe that
several of the thresholds that are unlikely to be capturing differences in Radio Rwanda
reception, nevertheless produce fairly large estimates.
D. Inter-Ethnic Trust (II): Evidence from the Trust Game
We depict trust-game offers by radio status and partner-type (inter-ethnic versus co-ethnic)
in figure 8 panel A. Here we observe that overall levels of trust (both co-ethnic and inter-
ethnic) appear lower in radio regions than non-radio regions. However, this pattern is re-
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versed and inter-ethnic offers are higher in radio regions, if we condition on a basic set of
controls, be it the baseline set or the full-set or even district fixed effects and distance to
various locations (as in table 2). This graph is pictured in figure 8 panel B. In addition, we
note that in regions not exposed to Radio Rwanda, average inter-ethnic trust offers are lower
than co-ethnic offers. However, exposure to Radio Rwanda reverses this and we observe that
inter-ethnic trust offers are marginally higher. Indeed this is unusual and is the only example
we know of with higher offers in inter-ethnic relative to co-ethnic trust games.
We now discuss the private version of the trust game before we turn to the public treat-
ment. Given that we also randomly assigned subjects to play the private- and public-
information treatments, we had a sample of 92 subjects who played the inter-ethnic, private
trust game; 150 subjects who played the co-ethnic, private trust game; 71 individuals who
played the inter-ethnic, public trust game; and 125 individuals who played the co-ethnic,
public trust game.
i) The Private Trust Game We first examine whether subjects in Radio Rwanda villages
make higher inter-ethnic trust offers in the private treatment. Panel A columns 1-6 of table
6 shows the main private trust game result: subjects receiving a Radio Rwanda transmission
make higher trust game offers, in the inter-ethnic variant of the game, of over 145RWF out
of a largest possible offer of 600RWF (columns 1 & 3), or about 1.13 standard deviations.
This corresponds to offers that are about 47% higher on average (column 5).
It is worth emphasizing that living in villages that receive radio seems to have a very
different impact on inter-ethnic trust game offers than on trust game offers between members
of the same ethnic group - see columns 2, 4 & 6. Indeed, the equality of the inter-ethnic and
co-ethnic coefficients can be rejected at the 1% level for each specification. Consistent with
our hypothesis, estimates of differences in inter-ethnic offers are much larger than differences
in co-ethnic offers.
Figure 7 shows our placebo exercise. We find the expected inverted U pattern.
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ii) The Public Trust Game The results from the public trust game are described in panel
B of table 6.50 Observe that public trust game offers are not higher among those exposed to
Radio Rwanda, in either the inter-ethnic or co-ethnic samples. Furthermore, the estimates
from the public trust game are not only smaller than their private trust game counterparts,
but they are significantly so (see the Equality of Coefficients: Private - Public (p-value) in
panel B of table 6). One possible reason for this may be that government programs other
than Radio Rwanda already induce subjects to change their behavior in public, so that
the additional effect of Radio Rwanda is minimal. Indeed, an examination of inter-ethnic
trust game offers in public relative to private games (table A17, columns 1-6) suggests that
public treatment offers may be different from private ones only in villages not receiving a
Radio Rwanda signal (though the effect is not always significant). Furthermore, the public
treatment appears to have had little impact on co-ethnic offers in either type of village (panel
B, table A17).
A sharper way of illustrating the impact of information on private and public trust offers
is depicted in figure 9. Here the x-axis in each panel measures the strength of the radio
signal (conditional on other village observables) and the y-axis measures trust game offers
(also conditional). Note the difference in the slope of the line between the two panels.
One concern however, is that the perceived probability that the private game is actually
private varies between regions that receive a Radio Rwanda signal and those that do not.
In this case the private game would not be able to differentiate between differences in the
attitudes of subjects, and their perceived risk that people will report their behavior to others.
Note that the SIT measure seems free of that concern, since the subjects likely believed the
task was a test of memory and not ethnic salience.51
50We again split the sample and examine p-values between estimates. However, in the appendix we also
provide the pooled sample, see table A15
51We also use data from Blouin (2016) on contractual defaults in the agricultural sector to further examine
this issue. One question in that data was how individuals responded to a contractual default, and whether
they report complaints to the local authorities and/or others in the village community. However we find no
difference between villages that receive a good Radio Rwanda signal and those that do not in this propensity
to report their contractual grievances - as can be seen in table A16.
35
E. Other Radio Stations
Under President Kagame, the Rwandan government controls the entire media landscape. The
threat of sanctions and self-censorship affects programming in almost all of the private radio
stations. However, whether these stations influence inter-ethnic attitudes is an empirical
question. Accordingly, we now examine whether the observed change in inter-ethnic attitudes
is driven by radio programs broadcast from any of the other radio stations.
Before examining this issue, we should point out that subjects live in areas that are
exposed to programming from only a subset of stations - see table A18. At the time that we
conducted our experiments, there were 24 stations other than Radio Rwanda that broadcast
in the country. Most of these were localized community-level private stations, and, indeed,
transmissions from only five radio stations (other than Radio Rwanda) reach two or more
of our 52 villages. At least one of these (the BBC) seems irrelevant in this context. This is
because only two villages in our sample (representing fewer than 5% of our subjects), receive
broadcasts from the BBC. Moreover, the BBC broadcasts from this radio transmission tower
were in English, a language that very few (if any) of the subjects speak. This was further
corroborated by our follow-up survey on radio-listening habits, where none of of the subjects
reported regularly listening to the BBC.
Nevertheless, we individually analyze reception of each of these five stations. We also
examine differences in attitudes based on whether a subject receives any other signal. As
a first step, we simply replace Radio Rwanda with each of the other stations in the main
empirical specifications. This helps illustrate whether the effect is limited to Radio Rwanda,
or is simply due to the presence of any radio signal. Estimates from each of these regressions
are plotted in figure 10, which provides an overview of these results. The figure offers support
for the hypothesis that the estimates from Radio Rwanda are somewhat distinct, with 19
of the 31 estimates from other stations being distinguishable statistically from the Radio
Rwanda inter-ethnic private game estimate.
The specific estimates for the impact of other stations on trust-game offers are presented
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in panel A of table A19. The estimates when all stations are combined together are pre-
sented in columns 1 and 2, and do not predict differences in inter-ethnic or co-ethnic trust.
Furthermore, we cannot rule out (as we could in the Radio Rwanda case) that the effect of
other stations is the same for co-ethnic and inter-ethnic trust (p = 0.953). Columns 3-4 show
results from a similar exercise that deals with concerns that the Radio Rwanda estimates
observed earlier were simply due to the fact that it has a much larger network than the other
stations. Similar to Bjorkegren (2015), we therefore construct a placebo network that looks
at a hypothetical signal of a station broadcasting from the top 10 peaks in Rwanda that
currently do not have a tower. Results there are similar to columns 1 and 2, and suggest no
impact on either inter-ethnic or co-ethnic attitudes.
Columns 5-14 repeat this exercise for each of the five individual stations. As the table
shows, the only significant inter-ethnic estimate stems, oddly, from the BBC, for which the
estimate on ethnic attitudes runs in the opposite direction of the Radio Rwanda estimate.
Panel B then reports the analogous results for trust game offers in the public treatment.
Two cases show a significant effect on public trust-game behavior (columns 6 and 14). In
general we are not overly concerned that the Radio Rwanda estimate is due to a correlated
signal with another station, as none of the other stations show any similar pattern across
trust game treatments.
Further emphasizing this point is the association between the other three main outcomes
and each of the other stations (see table A20). For example, with the BBC, in contrast to
the negative and significant inter-ethnic private estimate from table A19, we see a positive
estimate in the trust survey (panel D column 3) and a negative estimate in the SIT (panel D
column 1). Both are seemingly inconsistent with a poor inter-ethnic attitudes interpretation
that might otherwise be suggested by the trust game estimate. This apparent contradiction
undermines the legitimacy of both associations. For each of the other stations, similarly no
consistent patterns emerge using the other outcomes.
To further investigate the few significant results we see for the effects of other stations,
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we compute Bonferroni-corrected p-values that account for the fact that we are making
multiple comparisons over several stations (table A21). When we account for this fact, the
Radio Rwanda estimates remain significant in all cases where that was previously the case.
For the other stations, however that is not the case. Specifically, every significant estimate
in table A19 (trust game results) is no longer statistically significant after the Bonferroni
correction, while only the BBC effect remains statistically significant when we look at the
other measures. The BBC effect appears to be an anomaly. Recall that only two villages
received the BBC - only one of those is driving the significant effect that remains, it just so
happens that one of the two villages that receives BBC was the one that scored the lowest
mean SIT of all of the villages in the sample. Given the context, we attribute the remaining
significant effect associated with the BBC to sampling error.
In another robustness check relating to the signal from other stations, dummy variables
are included one at a time, for each of the towers that broadcasts Radio Rwanda to one of
the villages in the sample (table A22). If any individual tower were solely responsible for the
differences observed that might indicate that it is actually something else about the tower -
for instance broadcast of a different station - could have been responsible. However, table
A22 shows that the results are quite robust to this as well.
VII. Robustness
A. Genocide
We now evaluate the role of the genocide in possibly driving the empirical results. While
the genocide undoubtedly had an impact on the whole country, there may be concern that
differences in localized violence are associated with local differences in inter-ethnic ethnic
attitudes. This is an important channel to consider because recent evidence suggests that
exposure to war violence generates cooperation and pro-social behavior (Bauer et al. 2016).
This pro-social behavior may be driven by a number of alternative channels. For instance,
the destruction due to the genocide may provide an incentive to invest in social capital due
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to the need for insurance. Second, if there is an increase in wages and economic growth as a
consequence of the genocide (e.g. due to labor shortage), this may also foster social coopera-
tion and trust (Rogall and Yanagizawa-Drott 2013). Third, greater inter-group competition
may favor pro-social behavior especially amongst in-groups (Henrich and Boyd 2001; Choi
and Bowles 2007). Finally, the shock and trauma of witnessing the genocide may give rise
to a “never-again” sentiment, and may transform preferences in a pro-social direction.
There are several reasons why we do not think that accounting for the genocide alters
our results. First, it seems unlikely that genocide is a confound because we control for it
directly in our full set of controls. Furthermore, while radio played a role in the genocide,
the radio broadcasts that explicitly encouraged the genocide were from a different radio
station: RTLM. However, since RTLM shared a transmission tower with Radio Rwanda, we
want to be careful to avoid attributing greater pro-social inter-ethnic cooperation to Radio
Rwanda, when in fact it could in theory have been a by-product of the (RTLM-catalyzed)
genocide. Therefore, in each specification we directly control for RTLM broadcasts in 1994,
while the full set of controls includes genocide prosecutions. For there to be a confound of
these estimates, residual errors arising from mis-measurement or mis-specification of these
variables would have to be correlated with both radio signal and inter-ethnic attitudes. To
be certain, we run our main results separately for the subsample that did and did not receive
RTLM. We want to see that both estimates do not go towards zero. If they did, this would be
evidence of a spurious correlation. However, table A23 shows that we estimate very similar
effects to the main estimates in both the RTLM and non-RTLM villages. While we lose a
little precision because we split the sample even further than we had already done, we still
recover estimates precise at a 15% threshold in every case except the trust survey.
Similarly, for genocide to be a driver of the observed results, it must be correlated with
both the Radio Rwanda signal and with the main outcomes. Given that Yanagizawa-Drott
(2014) has shown that radio had an impact on the genocide, we first look at the relation-
ship between Radio Rwanda transmission and genocide in table A24. Column 1 replicates
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Yanagizawa-Drott (2014) using our sample, and shows that receipt of a RTLM signal is posi-
tively associated with genocide. We get less precision than the original estimates because all
villages in our sample experienced some genocide. Also consistent with his results, column
2 confirms that there is no relationship between Radio Rwanda and genocide.
Now consider the differential impact of exposure to the genocide on the four measures of
inter-ethnic attitudes. As mentioned above, several studies illustrate that exposure to the
genocide could result in greater pro-social behavior. However, most of the evidence (as well
as the theory) suggests that this should be reflected in improved co-ethnic attitudes and
trust and not inter-ethnic attitudes. Nevertheless, we directly test the impact of RTLM and
genocide on our four main outcomes in columns 3-6 of table A24. We find that exposure to
RTLM is not associated with any of the four measures - be it the SIT, the trust game,
the trust survey or partner selection. Similarly, when looking at genocide violence the
table suggests that it is negatively associated with responses to the survey question on
out-group trust, but actually positively associated with inter-ethnic offers in the private
trust game. Both seem to have increased ethnic salience, however not significantly so. While
our estimates are not precise, their general pattern suggests that genocide may have hurt
inter-ethnic relations. This lack of precision could be because there is heterogeneity in the
genocide effect by ethnicity, or because our sample is restricted to villages directly affected
by the genocide. We leave an analysis of these considerations to future work.
B. Measurement Error and Ethnicity
One potential concern with the trust estimates is the impact of measurement error in the
ethnicity variable. Because we were unable to directly ask individuals about their ethnicity,
we relied on a survey response to a question that proxies for whether an individual is Tutsi:
an affirmative answer to the question about their eligibility for a government fund set-up for
Tutsi survivors of the genocide.
It should be pointed out that this proxy could result in measurement error due to mis-
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attributing ethnicity. For example, this may arise if some Hutu deliberately masquerade as
Tutsi in order to receive FARG money, or if some Tutsi do not know that they are eligible
for receiving money from the fund. This seems unlikely not only because Rwanda is run by
an autocratic Tutsi leader, but also because of the country’s (unusual for Africa) high state
capacity. Indeed in our sample, all participants were aware of the fund. However, even if
mis-measurement of ethnicity occurred, it would not be able to explain the results unless
it systematically correlated with the variation in radio coverage. Accordingly, we further
examine whether this is a potential concern. Of course, we should emphasize that neither
the SIT results nor the trust survey results would be affected regardless because they do not
rely on knowledge of the subject’s ethnicity.
We try to assess whether any potential mis-measurement is likely to be correlated with
radio coverage by examining the nature of co-ethnic transactions in radio versus non-radio
regions. Suppose we allow for heterogeneity amongst the Hutu such that a subset of them
decides to masquerade as Tutsi in radio regions. This may be either because these Hutu
think they can get away with it, or because they look different, or feel less loyalty to the
Hutu community. However, if these Hutu are masquerading as Tutsi in radio regions in order
to receive FARG money, this will change the nature of co-ethnic matches both amongst the
Tutsi as well as the Hutu. For example, this would mean that several games in radio regions
coded as Tutsi-Tutsi co-ethnic games should have been coded as inter-ethnic games. This
may lower the observed Tutsi co-ethnic offers in radio regions. Similarly, perhaps any Hutu
who do not try to pass as Tutsi are different either because they look stereotypically Hutu,
or because they have stronger own-group loyalty. In this case, Hutu-Hutu trust offers in
radio regions should be higher than in non-radio regions.
Following this logic, we compare whether the nature of co-ethnic trust game offers differ
between the radio and non-radio regions in table A25, where we split the sample into Hutu-
Hutu and Tutsi-Tutsi games. In both cases the effect is not significant. Although the Tutsi-
Tutsi games show a large negative effect, we attribute this to the extremely small sample.
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Indeed, the Hutu-Hutu have a more reasonable sample to work with, and the estimate there
is essentially zero (17RWF ≈ 0.01USD). We interpret this as suggestive evidence that any
measurement error in our ethnicity variable is not associated with radio broadcasts.
C. Experimental Protocol and Implementation
i) Order of Experiments: Another concern may be that since each subject was involved in
more than one experiment, outcomes in one experiment could influence the others. Specif-
ically, each subject played the trust game twice and was randomly assigned to play either
first as a sender or as a receiver. We can therefore check whether playing as a sender first
had an impact on the offers. These results are described in table A27 and they are reassur-
ing; we observe that there is no correlation between playing first as a sender with either the
inter-ethnic trust game offers, co-ethnic trust game offers or SIT scores. Since the survey
and the partner-selection task took place before the trust game, the sender-receiver order is
not relevant for these measures.
ii) Geographical Characteristics of Trust-Game Partners: A reasonable concern regards
how partners in the trust game were matched. While individuals were matched randomly, if
ethnic groups are geographically clustered, this could mechanically result in co-ethnic pairs
being from villages that are closer to each other than inter-ethnic pairs. In this case, perhaps
what the subjects noticed was not an ethnic difference but instead a regional difference.
However, for this effect to confound our results this would also have to vary by reception of
Radio Rwanda. Accordingly, we examine this more systematically.
Table A28 examines the distance between the villages of two partners in the trust game,
to see whether this is explained by the trust game sender’s reception of Radio Rwanda. As
expected, Radio Rwanda does not explain this distance for any of the games, and in no case is
there a difference between estimates using the co-ethnic and inter-ethnic samples. Relatedly,
it could be that subjects from Radio Rwanda villages are more likely to be paired with
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someone else from a Radio Rwanda village. In this case their attitudes may not actually be
different, they may just expect a higher return because they expect their partner’s attitude
to be different. We disallowed verbal communication between partners, so it seems unlikely
that they could know the home village of any partner. However we can also show this
formally. Table A29 shows that offers are not higher when the partner is from a village that
receives Radio Rwanda.52
iii) SIT on Other Photo Characteristics: For the SIT to be a plausible measure of ethnic
salience, the key difference between the photographs should be ethnically distinctive facial
features. The SIT results would be difficult to interpret if there was some aspect of the
photographs that was correlated with ethnicity - be it age, gender, class, clothing or any
other aspect of their appearance. Accordingly, we selected individuals for the photos who
were either Hutu or Tutsi, but of the same gender and approximately the same age. Still,
there were some differences in the photos that were unavoidable, so it seems prudent to make
sure that these are not the differences that are being noticed by the subjects. Table A30
presents results from testing for as many differences as we can notice between the pictures.
Column 1 examines shirt color (light versus dark); column 2 looks at the background of the
photo - some photos were taken near our office and others near a market where you can see
the city in the background; column 3 investigates the type of shirt (collar versus no-collar);
in column 4 we look at facial hair while column 5 checks whether subjects categorized on
whether the person in the photo was wearing a jacket. For each of these photo characteristics
an SIT score was recomputed, based on that characteristic, and that new SIT score serves as
the outcome using the main model. However, none of these characteristics seems differentially
salient among people that live in a Radio Rwanda village.
52Return offers are higher when the sender is in a radio village because on average there is about a
one-for-one return of any money shared in the trust game (table A31)
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iv) SIT and Public Information: One last consideration is the effect of the public treatment
on the SIT score. The SIT is one of the main ways to identify that subjects’ attitudes are
different in Radio Rwanda regions, since most of the other outcomes could differ either
because of different attitudes or differences in strategic behavior used in order to appear
to have good inter-ethnic attitudes. Here we check whether being exposed to the public
information treatment in the trust game influenced SIT scores. The idea is that perhaps
priming subjects about the possibility of any of their results being made public might make
them more cautious of their behavior in the other exercises. There is no evidence that this
priming effect had any influence on SIT scores (table A32).
VIII. Discussion
In this paper we empirically analyzed nation building in the shadow of a genocide in Rwanda.
We used variation in exposure to government radio propaganda due to the mountainous to-
pography of Rwanda to investigate the impact of propaganda on nation building using a
series of lab-in-the field experiments. Our results show that individuals exposed to Radio
Rwanda have lower salience of ethnicity, increased inter-ethnic trust and show more willing-
ness to interact face-to-face with members of another ethnic group. These findings provide
some of the first quantitative evidence suggesting that the salience of ethnic identity can be
manipulated by governments.
We should emphasize that these results should be treated with considerable caution.
This is especially the case since we do not have a measure of the resilience or reversibility of
the observed improvement in Hutu and Tutsi relations in Rwanda. Any observed progress
in nation building may be temporary and vulnerable to the possibly shifting priorities of
President Kagame (and the RPF) or any unexpected political transition in the future. Fur-
thermore, its very distinctive political context makes Rwanda a difficult case study to serve
as a barometer of nation building efforts elsewhere. Indoctrinating and changing attitudes
is perhaps much easier in an autocratic country with no media freedom (such as Rwanda)
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than in a country with real media choices. We leave the study of nation building in other
political contexts for future work.
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Main figures
Figure 1: Village locations of all subjects in Rwanda
Note: This map shows the village subject locations and administrative boundaries (District level). Each subject left from
their own village (which is what is depicted here) to a pick-up location nearby. Our drivers picked them up from this location
and drove them to the survey location. The village locations are retrieved from a survey of subjects and then geo-coded to
the centroid of the village. Villages are often extremely small, so to protect the anonymity of the subjects we have altered,
randomly, the locations of each village by up to about 10km for the purpose of the map. Precisely, the random perturbation is
less than or equal to 0.1 decimal degrees from the actual village location.
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“This person owns a blue
bicycle and two red
motorbikes”
“This person really likes
bananas but dislikes guava”
“This person has four children:
two boys and two girls”
“This person has two brothers”
Figure 2: Example of SIT Exercise
Notes: This figure is an example of the tool used for the SIT exercise where we have replaced the original colored photographs
with pencil sketches. Subjects were shown the photographs and read the statement displayed beside it. In the recall portion of
the task, the photographs were laid out on a table and the statements were read back to the subject. The subject was tasked
with identifying the photograph associated with the statement. We chose subjects with a view that they were representative
of typical Tutsi (top two photos) and Hutu (bottom two photos) appearance. However, in order to protect anonymity of those
photographed, in her portraits, the artist made minor modifications to facial features and erased any identifying background.
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Figure 4: SIT and Radio Rwanda reception
Note: The graph plots estimates for each possible choice of the threshold defining whether a village receives a radio signal (at
intervals of 1db). Point estimates on the Radio Rwanda reception coefficient are denoted by a square, and lines represent 95%
confidence intervals. Each point and confidence interval is from a separate regression. Each regression includes the same set of
controls, which is the baseline set of controls from the tables. This includes all variables in table 1 panel B. The regressions in
this figure are analogous to column 2 of table 3. The SIT measure we use is the main measure, which is used in columns 1-3
in table 3 and defined in section V.A. Confidence intervals are constructed using standard errors clustered at the village level.
The dashed vertical line indicates the threshold used in the main results (45 db/µ).
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Figure 5: Partner selection measure and Radio Rwanda reception
Note: The graph plots estimates for each possible choice of the threshold defining whether a village receives a radio signal (at
intervals of 1db). Point estimates on the Radio Rwanda reception coefficient are denoted by a square, and lines represent 95%
confidence intervals. Each point and confidence interval is from a separate regression. Each regression includes the same set
of controls, which is the baseline set of controls from the tables. This includes all variables in table 1 panel B. The partner
selection measure we use is the main measure which is also used in columns 1-3 of table 4 and defined in equation (1). Confidence
intervals are constructed using standard errors clustered at the village level. The dashed vertical line indicates the threshold
used in the main results (45 db/µ).
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Figure 6: Out-group trust (survey) and Radio Rwanda reception
Note: The graph plots estimates for each possible choice of the threshold defining whether a village receives a radio signal (at
intervals of 1db). Point estimates on the Radio Rwanda reception coefficient are denoted by a square, and lines represent 95%
confidence intervals. Each point and confidence interval is from a separate regression. Each regression includes the same set of
controls, which is the baseline set of controls from the tables. This includes all variables in table 1 panel B. The trust measure
we use is from responses to the out-group trust survey question, which asks subjects how much they trust other communities.
This is the same measure used in table 5, columns 1 and 3. Confidence intervals are constructed using standard errors clustered
at the village level. The dashed vertical line indicates the threshold used in the main results (45 db/µ).
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Figure 7: Private, inter-ethnic trust game offer and Radio Rwanda reception
Note: The graph plots estimates for each possible choice of the threshold defining whether a village receives a radio signal
(at intervals of 1db). Point estimates on the Radio Rwanda reception coefficient are denoted by a square, and lines represent
95% confidence intervals. The dependent variable in each regression is the inter-ethnic trust game offers from the private trust
games. Each point and confidence interval is from a separate regression. Each regression includes the same set of controls,
which is the baseline set of controls from the tables. This includes all variables in table 1 panel B. The trust game measure we
use is the sender’s offer in the inter-ethnic private trust game. This is the same outcome and sample as in table 6, panel A,
columns 1 and 3. Confidence intervals are constructed using standard errors clustered at the village level. The dashed vertical
line indicates the threshold used in the main results (45 db/µ).
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Panel A: unconditional means Panel B: conditional means
Figure 8: Means of Trust Game Outcomes in Radio and Non-Radio Regions
Note: The figure shows the mean offers in the private trust game and associated 95% confidence intervals. Radio versus non-
Radio villages are split according to a 45db/µ cut-off used throughout the paper. Panel A shows unconditional means. Panel B
shows means conditional on district, distance to city, road and Kigali, and distance to the three nearest radio towers. This is
constructed by adding the mean of the trust game offers to the residuals from a regression of trust game offers on the variables
listed above.
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Figure 9: Inter-ethnic trust game offers in private (left) and public (right) and Radio Rwanda
reception
Note: This figure shows the conditional correlation between Radio Rwanda reception and both private inter-ethnic trust game
offers (left) and public inter-ethnic trust game offers (right). In both cases the plot is created by regressing the trust game
offer and the radio variable on the baseline set of controls, which can be found in table 1, panel B. Additionally we include the
trust-game specific controls in each regression, which include gender of partner, partners radio reception, the enumerator in the
trust game, the distance between the villages of the sender and the partner, as well as their score on a risk measure. We take
the residuals from these regressions and add them to the means of the relevant variables for the relevant sample (used in the
relevant regression) so that we can compare values across graphs. We then plot the re-meaned residuals against each other. To
make the graph easier to read, each dot in each graph represents the mean of an x-axis bin, where there are 40 equidistant bins
in each graph.
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Figure 10: Trust game offers and reception of each radio station
Note: This figure includes estimates for all radio stations that service more than 1 village in the sample. Each estimate and
95% confidence interval represents a regression coefficient from a separate regression. The coefficient of interest relates to the
station denoted on the vertical axis, while the horizontal axis denotes the magnitude of the estimate. Each regression includes
a Radio Rwanda variable in addition to the same baseline set of controls, and trust-game specific controls which include gender
of partner, partners radio reception, the enumerator in the trust game, the distance between the villages of the sender and the
partner, as well as the partners score on a risk measure. The list of baseline controls can be seen in table 1, panel C. Confidence
intervals are constructed using standard errors clustered at the village level. We tested for the number of point estimates that
are not equal to our private inter-ethnic Radio Rwanda coefficient at the 10% level. For private inter-ethnic games we have
3 (BBC, any other station, placebo), for private co-ethnic games we have 6 (Radio Rwanda, BBC, Radio10, Salus, any other
station, placebo), for public inter-ethnic games we have 5 (Radio Rwanda, BBC, ContactFM, Zombo, placebo), and 5 for public
co-ethnic games (Radio Rwanda, BBC, ContactFM, Salus, placebo). In total, 19 of the 31 estimates other than Radio Rwanda
x Private x Inter-ethnic are statistically different from that estimate.
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Main tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Variables of Interest
Radio Signal 438 0.48 0.50 0 1
Public Information 438 0.45 0.50 0 1
Panel B: Dependent Variables
Salience of Identity Test 438 0.86 0.28 0 1
Salience of Identity Test (Alternate) 438 1.22 0.79 0 5
Salience of Identity Test (Binary) 438 0.900 0.30 0 1
Partner Selection 438 0.433 0.29 0 1
Partner Selection (Alternate) 438 1.03 0.89 0 2.5
Partner Selection (IHST Count) 438 1.26 0.70 0 2.31
Trust Out-group (Survey question) 438 3.00 0.724 1 4
Trust In-group (Survey question) 438 3.21 0.764 1 4
Trust Game Offer Private (RWF) 242 329 126 100 600
Trust Game Offer Public (RWF) 196 335 129 100 600
Panel C: Baseline Control Variables
Tutsi 438 0.28 0.45 0 1
Gender (% Female) 438 40% 0.49 0 1
Age 438 43.3 12. 4 19 88
Distance to Road (km) 438 1.1 0.063 1 1.21
Distance to Capital (km) 438 59.9 26.1 10 105
Distance to Major City (km) 438 28.6 11.4 3.3 45.9
Light Density at Night 438 0.54 1.08 0 4.25
Dist. Nearest Station (km) 438 24.1 7.67 9 40
Dist. 2nd Nearest Station (km) 438 43.6 14.8 11 78
Dist. 3rd Nearest Station (km) 438 51.9 12.6 35 91
Travel Time to Nearest Station (sec) 438 5,121 2,617 1,233 11,588
Travel Time to 2nd Nearest Station (sec) 438 7,507 2,098 2,326 11,588
Travel Time to 3rd Nearest Station (sec) 438 8,238 1,726 5,071 11,588
Radio RTLM 438 0.19 0.39 0 1
Cell Phone Usage in Village (%) 438 69.3% 0.202 0.125 1
Raven Score 438 5.39 1.34 1 6
Panel D: Additional Control Variables
Elevation 438 1,646.1 185.3 1,365 2,141
Genocide Prosecutions (prosecutions per 1000)438 0.518 0.451 0 2.217
Variance in Elevation 438 26,187 88,449 0 357,286
Education years 438 5.8 2.56 0 19
Income (USD/yr) 438 460.54 877.33 0 9449
log (income) 438 5.38 1.26 0 9.15
log(sector pop.) 438 10.1 0.33 9.46 10.83
Sector Pop. Dens. 438 1,015 3,618 223 24,623
Facing North 438 0.25 0.43 0 1
Facing South 438 0.25 0.43 0 1
Facing East 438 0.32 0.47 0 1
Facing West 438 0.19 0.39 0 1
Panel E: Other Variables of Interest
log (land value) (log(USD)) 438 8.35 2.01 0 14.3
Reception of Other Stations 438 38.8% 0.488 0 1
Forced Labor 438 0.86 3.86 0 80
Migration (ever in lifetime) 438 22% 0.41 0 1
Years in Current Home 438 39.2 15.41 0 88
Migration Since 2004 438 3.7% 0.188 0 1
Good Signal of Radio Rwanda 154 5.8 1.22 3 9
Regular Radio Rwanda Listener 154 42% 0.49 0 1
Regular Listener of Other Stations 154 4.5% 0.21 0 1
Note: Data presented in this table was collected from 438 subjects in Rwanda (see sections III and IV for a description) as well as
a follow-up survey of 154 subjects (see section V). The Salience of Identity Test is computed using the share of within-ethnicity
mistakes. The Salience of Identity Test (Alternate) is the number of within-ethnicity mistakes squared over the total number
of mistakes. The Salience of Identity Test (Binary) is a binary variable equal to one if the share of within-ethnicity errors is
over 42%. The Partner Selection variable is computed as the share of selections in the partner-selection task from the other
ethnicity. The Partner Selection (Alternate) variable is the number of choices from the other ethnicity squared over the total
available choices from the other ethnicity. The Partner Selection (IHST count) is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation
applied to the count of choices from the other ethnic group, regardless of the number of available choices there were. All of
the travel time variables are measured in seconds. All of the distance variables are measured in kilometers. Raven Score is the
number of correct answers on an 8 question Raven Cognitive Test.
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Table 2: First stage & balancing
Dependent variable Mean N Radio Estimate Standard Error Public Estimate Standard Error Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Constructed Radio Signal and Reported Radio Signal and Habits
Radio Ownership (DHS data) 0.585 54,892 0.04*** (0.015) . . District FE
Signal Quality of RR (follow-up data) 5.8 154 1.38*** (0.36) -0.04 (0.17) Baseline
Regularly Listen to RR (follow-up data) 0.42 154 0.398*** (0.148) 0.03 (0.092) Baseline
Regularly Listen to Other Stations 0.05 154 -0.172*** (0.063) -0.034 (0.030) Baseline
(follow-up data)
Panel B: Baseline Controls
Gender (female = 1) 40% 438 -0.029 (0.063) -0.039 (0.047) distances & District FE
Age 43.3 438 -0.916 (1.783) -1.23 (1.158) distances & District FE
Tutsi 0.28 438 -0.083 (0.071) -0.045 (0.035) distances & District FE
Distance: road 0.1 438 -0.009 (0.009) 0.001 (0.003) distances (excl. road) & District FE
Distance: Kigali 60 438 5.22** (2.04) -0.156 (0.533) distances (excl. Kigali) & District FE
Distance: nearest city 28.7 438 -0.223 (0.973) -0.027 (0.317) distances (excl. city) & District FE
Light Density at Night 0.54 438 -0.670 (0.419) -0.064 (0.051) distances & District FE
RTLM 0.19 438 0.394*** (0.108) 0.058** (0.022) distances & District FE
Raven Score 5.39 438 0.162 (0.165) -0.006 (0.140) distances & District FE
Cell phones 69.5% 438 0.027 (0.060) -0.011 (0.013) distances & District FE
Panel C: Additional Controls
log(income) 5.37 438 -0.145 (0.144) 0.076 (0.100) distances & District FE
Genocide 0.518 438 0.062 (0.18) -0.007 (0.024) distances & District FE
Elevation 1,646 438 -41.3 (28.9) 1.19 (7.37) distances & District FE
Elevation Variance 26,187 438 4,309 (6,724) -1,174 (4,655) distances & District FE
Primary School 63% 438 0.0004 (0.067) 0.051 (0.046) distances & District FE
High School 2.1% 438 0.039 (0.025) 0.019 (0.013) distances & District FE
College 0.2% 438 -0.002 (0.003) -0.003 (0.003) distances & District FE
Facing North 0.247 438 -0.081 (0.167) 0.107*** (0.034) distances & District FE
Facing South 0.251 438 -0.051 (0.154) -0.058* (0.031) distances & District FE
Facing East 0.315 438 0.222 (0.146) -0.034 (0.031) distances & District FE
Facing West 0.187 438 -0.091 (0.165) -0.016 (0.021) distances & District FE
log(sector population) 10.1 438 0.094 (0.112) -0.003 (0.019) distances & District FE
Sector Pop. Dens. 6.17 438 4,779 (3,257) -219.6 (211.3) distances & District FE
Panel D: Other Variables of Interest
log(Land Value) 8.36 438 0.119 (0.232) -0.115 (0.186) distances & District FE
Radio Station: Zombo 0.290 438 0.08* (0.043) 0.005 (0.013) distances & District FE
Radio Station: Radio 10 0.098 438 0.142 (0.087) 0.010 (0.009) distances & District FE
Radio Station: BBC 0.039 438 0.029 (0.025) -0.019 (0.015) distances & District FE
Radio Station: ContactFM 0.039 438 0.017 (0.087) -0.008 (0.009) distances & District FE
Radio Station: Salus 0.078 438 0.044 (0.027) -0.023 (0.015) distances & District FE
Forced Labour 0.86 438 -0.558 (0.572) -0.232 (0.273) distances & District FE
Migration (in lifetime) 22% 438 -0.058 (0.060) -0.022 (0.033) distances & District FE
Migration (years in current home) 39.2 438 0.012 (2.38) -1.32 (1.34) distances & District FE
Migration (since 2004) 3.7% 438 0.041 (0.034) 0.019 (0.019) distances & District FE
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. Each row represents a different regression. The variable in the left-most column is the dependent variable.
The mean and number of observations of the dependent variable are listed in columns 1 and 2 respectively. Each regression
includes a variable for Radio Rwanda and assignment to the public trust game (except for the DHS data, wherein none of the
subjects played the trust game), which are the two regressors of interest in our results. See tables 3, 4, 5, 6 (Radio Rwanda)
and table A15 (Public treatment). Balancing estimates for these two variables are shown in columns 3 and 5 respectively.
Their associated standard errors are presented in columns 4 and 6. Column 7 shows the controls included in each regression.
All regressions with distances and district FE were run with: district fixed effects and distance (km) to nearest road, nearest
city, and Kigali. The table shows all of the baseline controls in panel B, except the distance and time to the towers, which
are mechanically related to radio signal. Panel C includes all of the additional controls in the full specification, while panel D
includes land value to double check whether wealth is balanced, as well as other stations and forced labor since those variables
are used in robustness exercises. We also examine migration here as migration could confound our estimates. We have 66 total
balancing estimates and 6 are significant at least at the 10% level.
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Table 3: SIT scores and Radio Rwanda reception
Dependent Variable: SIT score (WithinError
TotalError
) SIT score SIT
(WithinError
2
TotalError
) (WithinError
TotalError
> 0.42)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Radio Rwanda -0.133*** -0.0960*** -0.106** -0.319** -0.167***
(0.0463) (0.0289) (0.0464) (0.132) (0.0614)
Controls Baseline Baseline Full Full Full
Mistake FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 438 438 438 438 438
R2 0.213 0.402 0.426 0.416 0.285
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 0.855 0.855 0.855 1.243 0.916
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
respectively. Each column represents a different regression. All regressions with the baseline set of controls include controls
for: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel time (seconds) by car
to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM; light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali;
prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; and Raven Cognitive Test score. All regressions with the full set of controls
include all the baseline controls as well as: intensity of genocide; log income; share of village that is Tutsi; years of education;
village elevation; variance in sector’s elevation; log sector population; sector population density; cardinal direction the village
faces. Mistake fixed effects are a set of 5 dummy variables that denote whether a person made, 1, 2, 3, etc. mistakes in total
on the SIT, regardless of the nature of the mistake. All outcome variables are a variant of the SIT scores and each of the three
variants are described in section IV. In column 6-9 the dependent variable is binary, and these three columns are estimated
using a linear probability model.
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Table 4: Selection of Inter-ethnic Partners and Radio Rwanda reception
Dependent Variable: # other ethnicity chosen (# other ethnicity chosen)2 log(# other ethnicity
min{total, 5} min{total, 5} chosen)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Radio Rwanda 0.156*** 0.171*** 0.382*** 0.378***
(0.0274) (0.0360) (0.0955) (0.0924)
Controls Baseline Full Full Full
Observations 438 438 438 438
R2 0.406 0.421 0.497 0.440
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 0.420 0.420 1.01 1.22
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. Each column represents a different regression. All regressions with the baseline set of controls include
controls for: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel time (seconds)
by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM; light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest city, and
Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; and Raven Cognitive Test score. All regressions with the full set of
controls include all the baseline controls as well as: intensity of genocide; log income; share of village that is Tutsi; years of
education; village elevation; variance in sector’s elevation; log sector population; sector population density; cardinal direction
the village faces. All three outcomes are a variant of the share of out of ethnic group partners chosen. Column 4 uses the log
of a simple count variable. To account for the possibility of zeros in this variable, the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation is
used to construct the log.
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Table 5: Trust survey responses and Radio Rwanda reception
Dependent Variable: Out-group trust In-group trust Out-group trust In-group trust
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Radio Rwanda Reception 0.250** 0.0462 0.273** -0.106
(0.105) (0.170) (0.114) (0.191)
Equality of Coefficients (p-value) 0.068 0.005
Controls Baseline Full
Observations 438 438 438 438
R2 0.159 0.127 0.174 0.141
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 2.92 3.17 2.92 3.17
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. Each column represents a different regression. All regressions with the baseline set of controls include
controls for: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel time (seconds)
by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM; light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest city, and
Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; and Raven Cognitive Test score. All regressions with the full set of
controls include all the baseline controls as well as: intensity of genocide; log income; share of village that is Tutsi; years of
education; village elevation; variance in sector’s elevation; log sector population; sector population density; cardinal direction
the village faces. Outcome variables reflect answers to the following question: How much do you trust people from other (your
own) community in your village? [Not a lot / Just a little / Somewhat / A lot]. The Equality of Coefficients (p-value) tests
for the equality of Radio Rwanda coefficients between columns 1 and 2 and columns 3 and 4.
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Table 6: Trust game offers and Radio Rwanda reception
Dependent Variable: Trust Game Offers log(Trust
Game Offers)
Partnership Type: Inter-Ethnic Co-Ethnic Inter-Ethnic Co-Ethnic Inter-Ethnic Co-Ethnic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Private Trust Game Offers
Radio Rwanda Reception 148.5*** 10.79 168.6*** -53.01 0.476** -0.113
(52.51) (32.70) (54.43) (41.97) (0.228) (0.118)
Equality of Coefficients: Inter-ethnic - Co-ethnic (p-value) 0.004 0.0001 0.003
Controls Baseline Full Full
Trust game-specific controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 92 150 92 150 92 150
R2 0.670 0.406 0.718 0.489 0.698 0.508
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 325 343 325 343 6.38 6.45
Panel B: Public Trust Game Offers
Radio Rwanda Reception -37.60 -1.248 0.473 -52.67 0.174 -0.164
(59.07) (55.85) (77.24) (65.05) (0.217) (0.195)
Equality of Coefficients: Inter-ethnic - Co-ethnic (p-value) 0.570 0.479 0.121
Equality of Coefficients: Private - Public (p-value) 0.0001 0.799 0.002 0.994 0.090 0.716
Controls Baseline Full Full
Trust game-specific controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 71 125 71 125 71 125
R2 0.744 0.388 0.799 0.484 0.843 0.459
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 355 358 355 358 6.49 6.47
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
respectively. Each column represents a different regression. All regressions with the baseline set of controls include controls
for: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel time (seconds) by car
to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM; light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali;
prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; and Raven Cognitive Test score. All regressions also include trust-game
specific controls: gender of partner; whether partner receives Radio Rwanda; enumerator of trust game fixed effects; distance
between partners’ villages; and risk tolerance. All regressions with the full set of controls include all the baseline controls as
well as: intensity of genocide; log income; share of village that is Tutsi; years of education; village elevation; variance in sector’s
elevation; log sector population; sector population density; cardinal direction the village faces. All outcome variables reflect
the sender’s offer to the receiver in the trust game. The Equality of Coefficients Inter-ethnic - Co-ethnic (p-value) tests for
the equality of Radio Rwanda coefficients between columns 1 and 2 and columns 3 and 4 and columns 5 and 6, always within
the same panel. The Equality of Coefficients: Private - Public (p-value) tests for the equality of Radio Rwanda coefficients
between panel A and panel B, always within the same column.
67
Supplemental Appendix (For Online Publication)
Appendix A. Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Share of discussion topics that appear on Radio Rwanda
Notes: The figure was constructed using data collected by a Rwandan research assistant who listened to over 50 hours of radio
broadcasts in Rwanda in 30 minute segments. For each segment he wrote down whether any of a number of pre-specified topics
were mentioned. For the ethnicity based variables this requires some reading between the lines, as ethnicity is almost never
explicitly mentioned over the radio. In this graph, for each topic we calculate the share of mentions that appeared on a Radio
Rwanda relative to any other station operating in the country. The x-axis lists the topics that were tracked. The y-axis shows
the percentage of mentions of that topic appearing on Radio Rwanda relative to any other station.
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Figure A2: Share of programming dedicated to each topic
Notes: The figure was constructed using data collected by a Rwandan research assistant who listened to over 50 hours of radio
broadcasts in Rwanda in 30 minute segments. For each segment he wrote down whether any of a number of pre-specified topics
were mentioned. For the ethnicity based variables this requires some reading between the lines, as ethnicity is almost never
explicitly mentioned over the radio. In this graph, for each topic we calculate the share of mentions that appeared on a Radio
Rwanda relative to any other station operating in the country. The x-axis lists the topics that were tracked. The y-axis shows
the percentage of content on Radio Rwanda as well as the other stations that is devoted to each topic. The panel on the left
includes all stations while the panel on the right ignores the international radio stations like BBC and Voice of America, which
may self-censor less than the stations operating from within Rwanda.
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Figure A3: Four Main Outcomes And Radio Rwanda Reception Using Full Controls
Note: The graph plots estimates for each possible choice of the threshold defining whether a village receives a radio signal (at
intervals of 1db). Point estimates on the Radio Rwanda reception coefficient are denoted by a square, and lines represent 95%
confidence intervals. Each point and confidence interval is from a separate regression. Each regression includes the same set of
controls, which is the full set of controls from the tables. This includes all variables in table 1 panel B and C. The outcome
measures we use the same measure used in tables 3-6. Confidence intervals are constructed using standard errors clustered at
the village level. The dashed vertical line indicates the threshold used in the main results (45 db/µ).
A3
Figure A4: Raw signal data
Note: The figure shows the signal strength of Radio Rwanda, computed by the authors. Details of how the signal strength
variable was constructed can be found in Appendix C.
A4
Figure A5: Radio Signal Data represented as points at the centroid of each pixel
Notes: This is a map of Radio Rwanda signal strength in Rwanda. We have overlaid the district administrative boundaries
and the subject locations. Subject villages colored in teal are villages that receive a Radio Rwanda signal of over 45db/µ while
those colored in pink receive a signal less than 45db/µ. Because of the sampling procedure (see appendix D for details), each
star represents about 8 or 9 subjects. The figure shows the conversion of the raw radio signal data shown in figure A4, but as
points at the centroid of each cell. The resolution is of the radio signal data is 0.015 decimal degrees. Every dot represents a cell
that receives a radio signal (defined using a 45db/µ cutoff), conversely cells that do not receive a signal are blank. Villages are
often extremely small, so to protect the anonymity of the subjects we have altered, randomly, the locations of each village by
up to about 10km for the purpose of the map. Precisely, the random perturbation is less than or equal to 0.1 decimal degrees
from the actual village location. The assignment of radio signal to a village is based on the true location of the village rather
than the altered location of the village.
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Figure A6: Zoomed image showing how pixels were matched to village locations
Note: This figure shows a very up-close view of the villages in the sample in order to get a sense of where the identification
comes from. We have overlaid a contour plot on the subject locations. Each line on the contour plot denotes a constant elevation
so that continuous ring separating two locations implies that the villages are separated by either a mountain or a valley. The
contour interval in both maps are set to 100 meters so that a new line is drawn for every 100 meter change in elevation. Circles
represent the village centroid of the subjects. Each star represents between 8 and 9 subjects. Circles are shaded to represent
the signal strength of Radio Rwanda.
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Table A1: Subject participation and Radio Rwanda reception
Dependent Variables: Difference between subject
characteristic and sector-level
averages from the census
Variables Hutu Male Age Education
(years)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Radio Rwanda Signal 0.142* -0.0371 -0.444 0.0348
(0.0788) (0.0695) (0.361) (0.0517)
Public Information Treatment -0.0122 0.00504 -0.0309 0.00157
(0.00951) (0.0126) (0.0416) (0.00882)
Controls Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline
Observations 438 438 438 438
R2 0.454 0.483 0.702 0.455
Control group mean of dependent variable 0.454 0.483 0.702 0.455
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
respectively. All regressions were estimated with the baseline set of controls which includes: district fixed effects; enumerator
fixed effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers;
RTLM; light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level;
and Raven Cognitive Test score. Each outcome variable is the difference between the subjects characteristic and the average
characteristic from their sector from the last census. For the ethnicity variable we match to the 1991 census. For example, in
column 1 on average we received 14% fewer Hutu than were listed in the census from the same sector in Radio Rwanda villages.
Table A2: Unconditional correlation between 4 main outcomes
SIT Partner Selection Out-group Inter-ethnic
Trust (survey) Trust (trust game)
SIT (N=438) 1
Partner Selection (N=438) -0.0045 1
Out-Group Trust (survey) (N=438) 0.044 -0.032 1
Inter-ethnic Trust (trust game) (N=92) -0.027 0.167 0.034 1
Note: The table reports unconditional correlations between the main four outcomes in the paper. We use the full sample of
438 respondents for the correlations between the SIT, the Partner Selection measure and the out-group trust surveys. We use
the sample of those that played the inter-ethnic private trust game when we report the correlations between the inter-ethnic
trust game offers and the SIT, partner selection measure and the out-group trust survey.
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Table A3: Main results with a control for being assigned to be matched to a chosen partner
Out-group Inter-ethnic Trust
Dependent Variable: SIT Partner Selection Trust (survey) Game Offer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Radio Rwanda reception-0.144*** 0.152*** 0.265** 149.8***
(0.0425) (0.0277) (0.106) (52.34)
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Match control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 438 438 438 92
R2 0.221 0.407 0.161 0.677
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. Each column reports estimates from separate regressions. All regressions estimated with the baseline set
of controls include the following variables: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance
(km) and travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM; light density; distance (km) to nearest road,
nearest city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; and Raven Cognitive Test score. The match control
examined here is a control for whether the respondent was one of the individuals from each session chosen to be matched with
one of their five preferred partners.
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Table A4: SIT score and trust game offer
Dependent Variable: Trust Game Offers log(Trust
Game Offers)
Partnership Type: Inter-Ethnic Co-Ethnic Inter-Ethnic Co-Ethnic Inter-Ethnic Co-Ethnic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - Dependent Variable: Private Trust Game Offers
SIT -146.8*** 6.35 -140.4*** 12.87 -0.492*** -0.0265
(45.02) (39.91) (47.73) (39.30) (0.133) (0.108)
Equality of Coefficients: Inter-ethnic - Co-ethnic (p-value) 0.001 0.001 0.0002
Controls Baseline + Village FE Full + Village FE Full + Village FE
Trust game-specific controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 92 150 92 150 92 150
R2 0.884 0.634 0.893 0.656 0.876 0.639
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 391 371 391 371 6.62 6.56
Panel B - Dependent Variable: Public Trust Game Offers
SIT 34.76 -17.21 19.02 -34.15 0.0073 -0.172
(110.43) (88.89) (117.17) (85.23) (0.342) (0.254)
Equality of Coefficients: Inter-ethnic - Co-ethnic (p-value) 0.663 0.608 0.526
Equality of Coefficients: Private - Public (p-value) 0.079 0.773 0.100 0.547 0.062 0.533
Controls Baseline + Village FE Full + Village FE Full + Village FE
Trust game-specific controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 71 125 71 125 71 125
R2 0.847 0.590 0.849 0.617 0.878 0.574
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 300 354 300 355 6.37 6.52
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. Each column in each panel reports estimates from separate regressions. All regressions estimated with the
baseline set of controls include the following variables: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed effects; gender; ethnicity; age;
both distance (km) and travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM; light density; distance (km)
to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; and Raven Cognitive Test score. All
regressions estimated with the full set of controls include all the baseline controls as well as: intensity of genocide; log income;
share of village which is Tutsi; years of education; village elevation; variance in sector’s elevation; log sector population; sector
population density; cardinal direction village faces. The SIT variable we use here is a binary variable indicating that the subject
made more than 42% of their errors within-ethnicity in the SIT recall task. Results are similar using the continuous version
of the variable. All outcome variables reflect the sender’s offer to the receiver in the trust game. The Equality of Coefficients
Inter-ethnic - Co-ethnic (p-value) tests for the equality of Radio Rwanda coefficients between columns 1 and 2 and columns 3
and 4 and columns 5 and 6, always within the same panel. The Equality of Coefficients: Private - Public (p-value) tests for
the equality of Radio Rwanda coefficients between panel A and panel B, always within the same column.
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Table A5: Radio towers in Rwanda
Tower Latitude Longitude Directional Power Height+Elevation (meters) Stations
Mount Karongi -2.147 29.376 N 2.5 2,386.8 RR and others
Kigali/Mount Jari -1.886 30.01 N 0.5 1,861.1 RR and others
Butare -2.6 29.733 N 1 1,719.5 Others only
Kibagabaga -1.933 30.117 N 1 1,472.8 Others only
Kigali -1.944 30.058 N 2 1,503.8 RR and others
Kicukiro -1.996 30.1 N 0.5 1,604.8 Others only
Mount Karisimbi -1.506 29.45 D 5 4,468.7 RR and others
Kigali/Mount Rebero -1.993 30.074 N 1 1,733.7 Others only
Kibungo -2.197 30.529 N 10 1,495.9 RR and others
Mount Huye -2.564 29.684 N 1 2,074.3 RR and others
Gitarama -2.0667 29.75 N 2 1,814.7 Others only
Cyangugu -2.483 28.9 N 0.3 1,590.2 Others only
Butare/NUR -2.613 29.739 N 1 1,720.4 Others only
Nyagatare -1.3 30.317 N 1 1,346.6 Others only
Mutara -1.515 30.466 N 1 1,394.9 Others only
Gisenyi -1.699 29.269 N 1 1,610.3 Others only
Kinanira -2.541 28.976 N 1 2,040.6 RR and others
Rusizi -2.65 29.017 N 1 995.3 Others only
Nyarupfubire -1.27 30.4 N 5 1,551.9 RR only
Mount Mugogo -1.586 29.56 N 0.3 2,397.7 RR only
Rushaki -1.455 30.103 N 5 2,097.2 RR only
Musanze -1.4833 29.617 N 1 1,920.4 RR only
Nyabitimbo -2.578 29.066 N 1 1,727.7 RR only
Kibuye -2.056 29.35 N 1 1,466 RR only
Gihundwe -2.476 28.918 N 1 1,648 RR only
Buyumba -1.58 30.07 N 1 2,190 RR only
Bwisige -1.593 30.187 N 0.3 1,968.5 RR only
Note: The information in this table is used to construct the radio networks in ArcGIS. The source for the tower data comes
from FMScan.org. See Appendix 3 for details on how to reconstruct the radio signal data.
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Table A6: Selection of Radio Reception Definition
Dependent Variable: Reported Reception of Radio Rwanda
Threshold Used: 35db/µ 40db/µ 45db/µ 50db/µ 55db/µ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: > 20% of pixels receive a signal
Signal Received 0.141 -0.142 1.134*** 1.181*** 0.531
(0.238) (0.352) (0.269) (0.393) (0.469)
Observations 154 154 154 154 154
Panel B: Fraction of pixels with a signal
Signal Received 0.452 -0.873 2.314*** 1.241* 0.553
(0.444) (0.755) (0.733) (0.669) (0.622)
Observations 154 154 154 154 154
Panel C: > 50% of pixels receive a signal
Signal Received 0.0713 -0.249 0.779 0.293 0.208
(0.388) (0.570) (0.575) (0.564) (0.351)
Observations 154 154 154 154 154
Panel D: > 75% of pixels receive a signal
Signal Received 0.154 0.123 0.298 0.208 0.228
(0.311) (0.680) (0.565) (0.457) (0.429)
Observations 154 154 154 154 154
Baseline Controls (all panels) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. Each column in each panel reports estimates from separate regressions. All regressions estimated with the
baseline set of controls include the following variables: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed effects; gender; ethnicity; age;
both distance (km) and travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM; light density; distance (km)
to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; and Raven Cognitive Test score.
The dependent variable in each regression is a subjects score of the quality of the signal their village receives of Radio Rwanda.
The resolution of the radio data is high enough that we typically observe 3-5 pixels within a village. We construct and test four
different village level reception definitions against listening habits. They are (panel A) whether > 20% of the village receives
a signal; (panel B) a continuous variable measuring the fraction of pixels within the village that receives a signal; (panel C)
whether a simple majority (> 50%) of pixels within the village receive a signal; (panel D) whether a large majority (> 75%) of
pixels within the village receive a signal.
A11
Table A7: Robustness to using the share of locations receiving a signal
Dependent Variable SIT Partner Selection Out-group Inter-ethnic
Trust (survey) Trust (trust game)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of Locations Receiving a Signal -0.281*** 0.140** 0.165 162.04*
(0.0950) (0.0665) (0.188) (96.19)
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trust Game Specific Controls No No No Yes
Observations 438 438 438 92
R2 0.218 0.392 0.153 0.651
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. Each column in each panel reports estimates from separate regressions. The table examines robustness to
an alternate definition of Radio Rwanda reception that table A6 suggests may be valid. Instead of examining whether any
location in a village receives a Radio Rwanda signal, here we examine whether a greater share of locations receiving a signal
is similarly associated with each of our main outcomes. All regressions are estimated with the baseline set of controls, which
includes the following variables: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and
travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM; light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest
city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; and Raven Cognitive Test score. Column 4 also includes
trust-game specific controls for: gender of partner; whether partner receives Radio Rwanda; enumerator of trust game fixed
effects; distance between partners’ villages; and risk tolerance.
Table A8: Main results without controlling for light density at night
Out-group Inter-ethnic Trust
Dependent Variable: SIT Partner Selection Trust (survey) Game Offer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Radio Rwanda reception -0.132*** 0.157*** 0.250** 147.5**
(0.0489) (0.0254) (0.106) (55.63)
Baseline controls (excl. light density) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trust Game Specific Controls No No No Yes
Observations 438 438 438 92
R2 0.149 0.403 0.159 0.659
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. Each column in each panel reports estimates from separate regressions. All regressions estimated with
the baseline set of controls - except for the light density control - and include the following variables: district fixed effects;
enumerator fixed effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest
radio towers; RTLM; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level;
and Raven Cognitive Test score.
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Table A9: All covariates and outcomes by Radio Rwanda reception
Dependent Variable: SIT Partner Selection Out-Group Inter-Ethnic Trust
Trust (survey) Game Offer
Village Type: Radio No-Radio Radio No-Radio Radio No-Radio Radio No-Radio
Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Gender -0.0925** -0.0192 -0.0289 0.0405 -0.00943 0.107 16.34 -8.535
(0.0390) (0.0434) (0.0369) (0.0379) (0.113) (0.112) (17.32) (20.67)
Tutsi 0.00960 -0.0279 0.390*** 0.386*** 0.0113 -0.192* -15.80 1.767
(0.0455) (0.0439) (0.0431) (0.0384) (0.132) (0.114) (20.23) (20.95)
Age -0.000296 -0.00160 -0.00222 -0.00149 0.00628 0.00233 0.773 0.161
(0.00161) (0.00169) (0.00153) (0.00148) (0.00467) (0.00438) (0.717) (0.808)
Distance to nearest Tower 0.00244 0.0444 0.0536 -0.0613 0.483 0.0120 31.72 -53.88
(0.116) (0.0943) (0.110) (0.0824) (0.336) (0.244) (51.70) (44.95)
Distance to 2nd nearest Tower 0.0402 -1.745 -0.0262 -2.157 0.155 6.399 20.74 -501.0
(0.0714) (2.227) (0.0676) (1.947) (0.206) (5.760) (31.71) (1,062)
Distance to 3rd nearest Tower -0.0551 1.041 -0.0522 1.369 -0.345 -3.948 -43.91 319.6
(0.104) (1.408) (0.0981) (1.231) (0.299) (3.641) (46.02) (671.3)
Driving time to nearest tower -3.65e-05 0.00798 -5.42e-05 0.00961 -0.000592 -0.0285 0.00251 2.243
(0.000146) (0.00996) (0.000139) (0.00871) (0.000423) (0.0258) (0.0650) (4.750)
Driving time to 2nd nearest tower 0.000109 -0.00278 6.78e-06 -0.00250 0.000333 0.00868 -0.00575 -0.346
(0.000293) (0.00295) (0.000278) (0.00257) (0.000848) (0.00762) (0.130) (1.404)
Driving time to 3rd nearest tower 0.000198 -0.00555 3.59e-05 -0.00708 0.00226 0.0213 0.0547 -1.566
(0.000981) (0.00728) (0.000929) (0.00636) (0.00284) (0.0188) (0.436) (3.471)
Distance to major city 0.00222 0.388 -0.0539 0.648 -0.451* -1.703 -18.82 189.0
(0.0907) (0.654) (0.0859) (0.572) (0.262) (1.691) (40.31) (311.7)
Distance to nearest road -73.28 -82.61 258.2 -17,798
(88.99) (77.80) (230.2) (42,431)
Distance to Kigali 0.00120 0.635 0.0188 0.736 -0.0346 -2.281 3.617 143.4
(0.0242) (0.790) (0.0229) (0.691) (0.0700) (2.044) (10.75) (376.9)
RTLM -0.0792 2.709 0.0938 2.676 -3.347 -8.156 -112.4 825.6
(0.839) (3.132) (0.795) (2.739) (2.426) (8.101) (372.9) (1,494)
Light Density 0.0820 0.530 0.0247 0.793 1.309 -1.984 112.3 200.4
(0.277) (0.761) (0.263) (0.665) (0.802) (1.968) (123.2) (362.8)
Raven Score 0.0149 0.0339** 0.0127 0.00925 -0.0384 -0.0654* -2.408 0.675
(0.0137) (0.0153) (0.0129) (0.0133) (0.0395) (0.0394) (6.068) (7.272)
Elevation -0.000527 -0.0128 -0.000620 -0.0225 0.00500 0.0581 -0.0331 -5.846
(0.00145) (0.0224) (0.00138) (0.0196) (0.00420) (0.0581) (0.645) (10.70)
Variance in Elevation -2.20e-06 0.00318 3.06e-07 0.00400 -4.44e-06 -0.0113 -0.000367 1.173
(1.89e-06) (0.00415) (1.79e-06) (0.00363) (5.46e-06) (0.0107) (0.000839) (1.977)
Cell use in village 0.211 -4.925 -0.0238 -6.028 2.087 18.64 84.04 -1,365
(0.462) (6.115) (0.438) (5.346) (1.336) (15.82) (205.3) (2,916)
Genocide violence 0.162 10.60 -0.124 11.90 -1.273 -37.07 30.91 2,516
(0.390) (12.54) (0.370) (10.96) (1.129) (32.43) (173.5) (5,978)
log(income) -0.0235 -0.00115 0.00520 -0.00228 -0.0124 -0.0134 8.228 4.102
(0.0164) (0.0165) (0.0155) (0.0144) (0.0474) (0.0426) (7.288) (7.847)
Share of Village that is Tutsi 0.196 30.89 0.283 37.46 1.562 -108.3 74.72 9,464
(0.919) (38.70) (0.870) (33.83) (2.656) (100.1) (408.2) (18,451)
Education 0.00884 0.00201 -0.00623 0.00378 -0.0197 0.00362 2.199 10.90***
(0.00726) (0.00842) (0.00688) (0.00736) (0.0210) (0.0218) (3.226) (4.013)
log(sector population) 1.215 15.40 -0.0160 14.17 1.569 -50.14 338.8 2,151
(1.113) (16.27) (1.054) (14.22) (3.218) (42.08) (494.6) (7,758)
Population Density -2.31e-05 -0.0168 -1.25e-06 -0.00354 -0.000149 0.0454 -0.00963 5.179
(7.20e-05) (0.0194) (6.82e-05) (0.0170) (0.000208) (0.0502) (0.0320) (9.252)
North Facing Village 0.257 -6.284 0.00212 -7.345 1.337 22.37 112.4 -1,657
(0.282) (7.676) (0.267) (6.711) (0.816) (19.85) (125.3) (3,660)
South Facing Village 0.151 -7.747 -0.00629 -8.291 -0.0806 26.02 100.9* -1,847
(0.130) (8.788) (0.123) (7.683) (0.376) (22.73) (57.86) (4,190)
East Facing Village 0.182 -3.877 0.146 -5.001 0.435 14.32 110.3 -1,282
(0.250) (5.138) (0.237) (4.492) (0.724) (13.29) (111.3) (2,450)
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enumerator Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 211 227 211 227 211 227 211 227
R2 0.398 0.259 0.430 0.492 0.208 0.244 0.199 0.319
Group Mean of Dependent Variable 0.859 0.855 0.447 0.420 3.08 2.93 318 345
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. Each column represents a separate regression. The distance variables are all in km, while the driving times
are in seconds. The elevation data is in meters. Raven Score is the number of correct answers, with a maximum of eight.
A13
Table A11: Main results (sector fixed-effects)
Dependent Variable: SIT Partner Selection Out-Group Inter-Ethnic Trust
Trust (survey) Game Offer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Radio Rwanda Signal -0.178*** 0.0671** 0.0958 76.88***
(0.0562) (0.0283) (0.125) (22.32)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance to Nearest towers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Radio RTLM Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trust-game specific controls No No No No
Observations 438 438 438 92
R2 0.146 0.101 0.103 0.457
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 0.916 0.420 2.93 325
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. Sector (rather than the typical district) fixed effects are included along with controls for both distance (km)
and travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers were included. A control for RTLM was also included.
We do not use the full control set because with the inclusion of the sector fixed-effects we begin to lose statistical power.
Table A12: SIT Errors
Dependent Variable: # SIT Errors
(1) (2)
Radio Rwanda 0.331 0.539*
(0.225) (0.276)
Controls Baseline Full
Observations 438 438
R2 0.229 0.273
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 1.76 1.76
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. The regression using the baseline set of controls include controls for: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed
effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; Radio
RTLM dummy variables; light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali; Prevalence of cell phone usage
at the village level; and Raven Cognitive Test score. The regression using the full set of controls include all the baseline controls
as well as: intensity of genocide; log income; share of village which is Tutsi; years of education; village elevation; variance in
sector’s elevation; log sector population; sector population density; cardinal direction village faces.
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Table A13: Robustness of Measures to a Continuous Measure of Radio Reception
Dependent Variable: SIT Partner Selection Out-Group Inter-Ethnic Trust
Trust (survey) Game Offer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Radio Rwanda Signal (Cont.)-0.00952** 0.00421* 0.00933* 3.060
(0.00396) (0.00237) (0.00487) (3.361)
Controls Full Full Full Full
Trust-game specific controls No No No Yes
Observations 438 438 438 92
R2 0.191 0.411 0.171 0.702
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. All regressions using the full set of controls include controls for: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed
effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM;
light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; Raven
Cognitive Test score; intensity of genocide; log income; share of village which is Tutsi; years of education; village elevation;
variance in sector’s elevation; log sector population; sector population density; cardinal direction village faces. Column 4 also
includes trust-game specific controls for: gender of partner; whether partner receives Radio Rwanda; enumerator of trust game
fixed effects; distance between partners’ villages; and risk tolerance.
Table A14: Partner Selections for Income and Radio Rwanda
Dependent Variable: Avg. log(income)
of choices
(1) (2)
Radio Rwanda 0.143 0.271
(0.315) (0.307)
Controls Baseline Full
Observations 438 438
R2 0.089 0.111
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 11.63 11.63
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. The regression using the baseline set of controls includes: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed effects;
gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; Radio RTLM
dummy variables; light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the
village level; and Raven Cognitive Test score. The regression using the full set of controls include all of the baseline controls
as well as: intensity of genocide; log income; share of village which is Tutsi; years of education; village elevation; variance in
sector’s elevation; log sector population; sector population density; cardinal direction village faces. The dependent variable is
the average income of the 5 choices the subject made in the partner selection task.
A16
Table A15: Pooled Trust Game Regressions
Dependent Variable: Trust Game Offers
Sample: inter-ethnic co-ethnic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Radio 61.63 110.3** 57.09 125.6*** -4.349 1.736 7.040 13.35
(37.08) (43.49) (37.63) (42.02) (31.10) (30.13) (30.69) (29.41)
Public 6.660 54.66* 32.92 77.81 16.33 23.99 65.95 70.41
(18.88) (27.65) (67.28) (71.45) (17.33) (27.61) (64.56) (67.33)
Radio x Public -89.24*** -122.8*** -16.70 -17.07
(32.36) (38.26) (33.62) (32.55)
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trust Game Specific Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interactions Between Trust Game and Public No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 163 163 163 163 275 275 275 275
R2 0.514 0.537 0.543 0.578 0.226 0.227 0.258 0.259
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. Each column reports estimates from a separate regression. All regressions estimated with the baseline set
of controls include the following variables: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance
(km) and travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM; light density; distance (km) to nearest
road, nearest city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; and Raven Cognitive Test score. Each column
also includes trust-game enumerator fixed effects as well as controls for: gender of partner; whether partner receives Radio
Rwanda; distance between partners’ villages; and risk tolerance. We also in two columns include interactions between whether
the game was public or private and the following (trust game specific) controls: gender of partner; whether partner receives
Radio Rwanda; distance between partners’ villages; and risk tolerance. The dependent variable in each case is the offer made
by the sender to the receiver in the first stage of the trust game.
Table A16: Contract dispute resolution and Radio Rwanda reception
Dependent Variable: External Punishment Internal Punishment No Punishment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Radio Rwanda Signal 0.0292 -0.0316 0.0921 0.000172 -0.0957* -0.0751
(0.0720) (0.0814) (0.0671) (0.0989) (0.0490) (0.0523)
Controls Baseline Full Baseline Full Baseline Full
Observations 438 438 438 438 438 438
R2 0.230 0.261 0.349 0.362 0.220 0.238
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. All regressions using the baseline set of controls include: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed effects;
gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; Radio RTLM;
light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; and
Raven Cognitive Test score. The full set of controls includes all the baseline controls as well as: intensity of genocide; log
income; share of village which is Tutsi; years of education; village elevation; variance in sector’s elevation; log sector population;
sector population density; cardinal direction village faces. The dependent variable relies on data from Blouin (2016), which
asks subjects about how they punish people that have wronged them in a contract dispute. External punishment is defined
as either going to government or spreading rumours in response to broken contracts. Internal punishment is defined as either
restricting future business with an individual who breaks a contract, or specifying fines in advance.
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Table A17: Assignment to public trust game treatment and trust game offers
Dependent Variable: Trust Game Offers log(Trust
Game Offers)
Village Type: Radio No-Radio Radio No-Radio Radio No-Radio
Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Inter-ethnic Trust Game Offers
Assignment to Public Trust Game -31.32 54.96 -30.07 68.22** -0.0724 0.254
(23.37) (33.32) (26.09) (32.43) (0.0784) (0.152)
Equality of Coefficients: RR - No RR (p-value) 0.006 0.0007 0.0049
Controls Baseline Full Full
Trust game-specific controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 83 80 83 80 83 80
R2 0.676 0.709 0.726 0.773 0.787 0.730
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 346 325 346 325 6.48 6.37
Panel B: Co-ethnic Trust Game Offers
Assignment to Public Trust Game -0.505 20.92 -2.359 0.589 0.00264 -0.0257
(23.65) (28.50) (27.36) (30.14) (0.0910) (0.0951)
Equality of Coefficients: RR - No RR (p-value) 0.473 0.919 0.795
Equality of Coefficients: Inter-ethnic - Co-ethnic (p-value) 0.231 0.323 0.271 0.017 0.323 0.012
Controls Baseline Full Full
Trust game-specific controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 128 147 128 147 128 147
R2 0.417 0.328 0.447 0.469 0.466 0.445
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 306 343 306 343 6.35 6.45
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
respectively. Each column represents a different regression. All regressions with the baseline set of controls include controls
for: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel time (seconds) by car
to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM; light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali;
prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; and Raven Cognitive Test score. All regressions also include trust-game
specific controls: gender of partner; whether partner receives Radio Rwanda; enumerator of trust game fixed effects; distance
between partners’ villages; and risk tolerance. All regressions with the full set of controls include all the baseline controls as
well as: intensity of genocide; log income; share of village that is Tutsi; years of education; village elevation; variance in sector’s
elevation; log sector population; sector population density; cardinal direction the village faces. All outcome variables reflect the
sender’s offer to the receiver in the trust game. The Equality of Coefficients: RR - No RR (p-value) tests for the equality of
Public Trust Game coefficients between columns 1 and 2 and columns 3 and 4 and columns 5 and 6, always within the same
panel. The Equality of Coefficients: Inter-ethnic - Co-ethnic (p-value) tests for the equality of Public Trust Game coefficients
between panel A and panel B, always within the same column.
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Table A18: Radio Stations and Broadcast Towers in Rwanda
Station Number Tower 1 Tower 2 Tower 3 Tower 4 Tower 5 Total Land
of Towers Coverage (% RW)
BBC Africa 3 Mount Karongi Kigali/Mount Jari Butare 5.3%
Choice FM 1 Kibagabaga 1.0%
City Radio 1 Kigali 0.1%
Contact FM 1 Kicukiro 2.5%
Deutsche Welle 1 Kigali 1.0%
Flash FM 1 Kigali/Mount Jari 1.0%
Magic FM 1 Mount Karisimbi 36.7%
Radio 1 1 Mount Karisimbi 36.7%
Radio 10 FM 2 Kigali/Mount Jari Kigali/Mount Rbro 3.5%
Radio Ijwi Ry’ibyiringiro 1 Kigali 1.0%
Radio Izuba 1 Kibungo 0.5%
Radio Maria-Nyina wa Zombo 5 Mount Huye Gitarama Kigali/Mount Jari Cyangugu Mount Karongi 31.2%
Radio Salus 2 Butare/NUR Butare 1.8%
Radio Umucyo 1 Kigali 1.0%
RC Huye 2 Gitarama Butare 1.5%
RC Musanze 1 Mount Karisimbi 36.7%
RC Nyagatare 2 Nyagatare Mutara 1.4%
R.Communitaire de Butare 1 Butare 0.8%
R.Communitaire de Cyangugu 1 Cyangugu 1.2%
RC Rabavu 2 Mount Karongi Gisenyi 4.6%
RC Rusizi 3 Kinanira Mount Karongi Rusizi 7.8%
RFI Afrique 1 Kigali 1.0%
Sana Radio/Restore FM 1 Kigali 1.0%
VOA Africa 1 Kigali 1.0%
Radio Rwanda 17 See table titled: Radio Towers in Rwanda 44.1%
Potential Coverage (All towers) 27 See table titled: Radio Towers in Rwanda 44.1%
Note: The information tower and station information in this table is used to construct the radio networks in ArcGIS. The
source for the tower data comes from FMScan.org. See Appendix 3 for details on how to reconstruct the radio signal data. The
national coverage of each station is author calculation.
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Table A20: Inter-ethnic bahavior and reception of stations other than Radio Rwanda
Dependent Variable: SIT Partner Selection Out-Group
Trust (survey)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A - Station considered: Any other station
Reception in village of station -0.111 0.0370 -0.328
(0.0808) (0.0485) (0.201)
Observations 438 438 438
R2 0.405 0.406 0.163
Panel B - Station considered: Placebo
Reception in village of station 0.118*** -0.037 -0.069
(0.0363) (0.0366) (0.0843)
Observations 438 438 438
R2 0.415 0.407 0.159
Panel C - Station considered: Zombo
Reception in village of station 0.0182 0.106 -0.137
(0.124) (0.0835) (0.301)
Observations 438 438 438
R2 0.402 0.406 0.159
Panel D - Station considered: BBC
Reception in village of station -0.462*** 0.0352 0.341**
(0.0668) (0.0899) (0.155)
Observations 438 438 438
R2 0.427 0.406 0.161
Panel E - Station considered: ContactFM
Reception in village of station -0.192** -0.132 -0.146
(0.078) (0.0824) (0.191)
Observations 438 438 438
R2 0.406 0.408 0.159
Panel F - Station considered: Salus
Reception in village of station -0.142 -0.177** -0.273
(0.102) (0.0662) (0.200)
Observations 438 438 438
R2 0.405 0.411 0.161
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 0.851 0.423 2.92
Controls (All Panels) Baseline Baseline Baseline
Mistake FE Yes No No
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. All regressions included controls for: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed effects; gender; ethnicity; age;
both distance (km) and travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM; light density; distance (km)
to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; Raven Cognitive Test score and
Radio Rwanda. The variable Any Other Station is a binary variable equal to one if any of the other stations (not including the
Placebo station) receives a signal strength in the village of greater than 45db/µ. The Placebo station is a variable capturing
the hypothetical signal from the top 10 peaks in Rwanda that do not currently have a radio tower on them. It, as well as each
of the other stations, is a binary variable equal to one if signal strength of that station in the village is greater than 45db/µ.
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Table A21: Bonferroni Corrected P-Values for Each Station
Trust Game
Private Public
Dependent Variable: SIT Partner Selection Trust Survey inter-ethnic co-ethnic inter-ethnic co-ethnic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Radio Rwanda -0.181*** 0.173*** 0.300** 162.7* 26.86 -102.8 -5.589
[0.002] [0.00] [0.047] [0.060] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Placebo Station 0.0964 -0.0456 -0.111 -26.92 -37.19 1.745 26.64
[0.170] [0.708] [0.859] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Zombo -0.0665 0.138 -0.195 -41.20 65.23 -154.1 276.2
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [0.317]
Radio 10 0.130 0.0313 -0.606 12.86 -171.3 229.2 66.63
[1.00] [1.00] [0.176] [1.00] [0.577] [1.00] [1.00]
BBC -0.426*** 0.0258 0.454** -216.8 -108.6 -125.7 -57.71
[0.000] [1.00] [0.028] [0.346] [0.748] [1.00] [1.00]
Contact FM -0.0886 -0.183 0.00640 0.208 22.13 -205.7 -149.5
[1.00] [0.299] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Radio Salus -0.186 -0.121 -0.172 -0.584 -94.27 16.51 -38.77
[0.519] [0.606] [1.00] [1.00] [0.994] [1.00] [1.00]
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trust Game Specific Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 438 438 438 92 150 71 125
R2 0.253 0.415 0.170 0.699 0.441 0.791 0.419
Note: p-values derived from standard errors clustered by village, and corrected for multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni
correction are in square parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. All
regressions included controls for: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and
travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM; light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest
city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; and Raven Cognitive Test score. Trust-game specific controls
include: gender of partner; whether partner receives Radio Rwanda; enumerator of trust game fixed effects; distance between
partners’ villages; and risk tolerance. Each column represents a single regression.
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Table A22: Inter-ethnic behavior and Radio Rwanda reception (controlling for reception
from specific towers)
Dependent Variable: SIT Partner Selection Out-Group Inter-Ethnic Trust
Trust (survey) Game Offer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Tower 1
Radio Rwanda Reception -0.210*** 0.168*** 0.264** 162.7***
(0.0751) (0.0369) (0.114) (51.08)
Controls Full Full Full Full
Trust-game specific controls No No No Yes
Tower Control Tower 1 Tower 1 Tower 1 Tower 1
Observations 438 438 438 92
R2 0.195 0.421 0.174 0.719
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 0.916 0.420 2.93 345
Panel B: Tower 2
Radio Rwanda Reception -0.209*** 0.175*** 0.286*** 169.6***
(0.0702) (0.0286) (0.103) (51.82)
Controls Full Full Full Full
Trust-game specific controls No No No Yes
Tower Control Tower 2 Tower 2 Tower 2 Tower 2
Observations 438 438 438 92
R2 0.196 0.424 0.178 0.723
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 0.916 0.420 2.93 345
Panel C: Tower 3
Radio Rwanda Reception -0.204** 0.140*** 0.335*** 202.8***
(0.0886) (0.0420) (0.118) (63.9)
Controls Full Full Full Full
Trust-game specific controls No No No Yes
Tower Control Tower 3 Tower 3 Tower 3 Tower 3
Observations 438 438 438 92
R2 0.193 0.423 0.175 0.725
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 0.916 0.420 2.93 345
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
respectively. The variable Tower Control is simply a dummy variable indicating whether a given village receives its best a radio
reception from a given Tower. All regressions include controls, including: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed effects; gender;
ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM; light density;
distance (km) to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; Raven Cognitive
Test score; intensity of genocide; log income; share of village which is Tutsi; years of education; village elevation; variance in
sector’s elevation; log sector population; sector population density; cardinal direction village faces. Column 4 also includes
trust-game-specific controls: gender of partner; whether partner receives Radio Rwanda; enumerator of trust game fixed effects;
distance between partners’ villages; and risk tolerance. The dependent variable in column 4 is the private, inter-ethnic trust
game offer.
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Table A23: Main Effect Broken Down by RTLM Status
Dependent Variable SIT Partner Selection Trust Survey Trust Game
(out-group) (inter-ethnic)
RTLM Village Status No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Radio Rwanda Village -0.0774† -0.454*** 0.115*** 0.152** 0.114 -0.131 107.7† .
(0.0490) (0.108) (0.0370) (0.0609) (0.108) (0.158) (68.90) .
Subset of baseline controls (see notes) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trust game-specific controls (excl. enumerator FE) No No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 352 86 352 86 352 86 75 17
R2 0.230 0.271 0.389 0.634 0.150 0.335 0.404 1.000
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. † *, **, and *** represent significance at the 15%, 10%, 5%, and
1% levels respectively. All regressions control for the baseline controls with a few control variables dropped to avoid collinearity
of the Radio Rwanda variable in the smaller sample (which is an issue for all outcomes with the entire set of baseline controls).
The variables we exclude are the distance and time to the third nearest radio tower; gender; age. This leaves us with the
following controls: Tutsi indicator; enumerator fixed effects (for the survey); district fixed effects; time and distance to the two
nearest radio towers; distance to the capital, nearest big city and road; village level cell phone availability; and Raven score.
RTLM reception, which is also in the baseline set of controls is not included because the sample is conditioned on its (historical)
reception. The trust game regression includes the full set of trust-game specific controls used throughout with the exception of
the trust game enumerator fixed-effects. It therefore includes: gender and radio status of partner; distance between the villages
of the partners; risk preference are all included.
Table A24: Genocide
Dependent Variable: Genocide SIT Partner Selection Out-Group Inter-ethnic
Trust (survey) Trust Game Offer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Radio Rwanda Reception 0.0954 -0.176*** 0.171*** 0.273** 168.6***
(0.164) (0.0607) (0.0360) (0.114) (54.43)
Radio RTLM Reception 0.201 0.152 0.0849 -0.0677 -0.153 -120.9
(0.142) (0.196) (0.0722) (0.0456) (0.141) (96.41)
Genocide Violence 0.0701 0.0363 -0.177 103.5
(0.0672) (0.0554) (0.117) (87.50)
Controls Full Full Full Full Full Full
(excl. genocide) (excl. genocide)
Trust-game specific controls No No No No No Yes
Observations 438 438 438 438 438 92
R2 0.840 0.842 0.242 0.421 0.174 0.726
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 0.567 0.567 0.855 0.420 2.93 325
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. All regressions using the full set of controls include controls for: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed
effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM;
light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; Raven
Cognitive Test score; intensity of genocide; log income; share of village which is Tutsi; years of education; village elevation;
variance in sector’s elevation; log sector population; sector population density; cardinal direction village faces. Column 6 also
includes controls used in trust game analysis: gender of partner; whether partner receives Radio Rwanda; enumerator of trust
game fixed effects; distance between partners’ villages; and risk tolerance. The dependent variable in column 6 is the private,
inter-ethnic trust game offer.
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Table A25: Measurement Error
Dependent Variable Trust Game Offer
Sample Tutsi-Tutsi Hutu-Hutu
(1) (2)
Radio Rwanda -154.5 17.67
(274.1) (39.31)
Controls Baseline Baseline
Observations 38 237
R2 0.670 0.198
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 345 350
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. All regressions using the baseline set of controls include controls for: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed
effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM;
light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali; level of cell phone usage at the village level; and Raven
Cognitive Test score. We note that our small sample size of Tutsi co-ethnic pairs means estimates should be interpreted with
caution.
Table A26: Enumerator Effects
Dependent Variable: SIT Partner Selection Out-Group Inter-Ethnic Trust
Trust (survey) Game Offer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Radio Rwanda Reception -0.158** -0.176*** 0.175*** 0.171*** 0.267** 0.273** 124.9** 166.6***
(0.0614) (0.0607) (0.0335) (0.0360) (0.126) (0.114) (63.55) (54.42)
Equality of Coefficients (p-value) 0.376 0.687 0.825 0.392
Controls Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
Trust-game specific controls No No No No No No Yes Yes
Includes Enum. FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 438 438 438 438 438 438 92 92
R2 0.117 0.242 0.406 0.421 0.112 0.174 0.424 0.718
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 0.855 0.855 0.420 0.420 2.93 2.93 326 326
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. All regressions using the full set of controls include controls for: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed
effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM;
light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; Raven
Cognitive Test score; intensity of genocide; log income; share of village which is Tutsi; years of education; village elevation;
variance in sector’s elevation; log sector population; sector population density; cardinal direction village faces. Where indicated,
enumerator fixed effects were dropped from this set. Columns 7 and 8 also include standard trust game controls for: gender of
partner; whether partner receives Radio Rwanda; enumerator of trust game fixed effects; distance between partners’ villages;
and risk tolerance. Trust game offers used to estimate columns 7 and 8 are for private, inter-ethnic games.
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Table A27: Difference in offers based on playing first as a sender vs receiver
Dependent Variable: Trust Game Offer SIT score (WithinError
TotalError
)
Sample: Inter-ethnic Co-ethnic All
(1) (2) (3)
First Trust Game Played as Receiver -26.53 1.236 0.0306
(33.02) (20.13) (0.0462)
Controls Baseline Baseline Baseline
Trust game specific controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 163 275 438
R2 0.507 0.225 0.214
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 321 324 0.863
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. We include trust-game specific controls for: gender of partner; whether partner receives Radio Rwanda;
enumerator of trust game fixed effects; distance between partners’ villages; and risk tolerance. All regressions use the baseline
set of controls, and include: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel
time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; Radio RTLM dummy variables; light density; distance (km) to
nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; and Raven Cognitive Test score. The
variable First Trust Game Played as Receiver is a binary variable equal to one if the first trust game that the subject played
was as a receiver. We test whether this influenced their decisions in subsequent games. We omit the partner selection task
outcome and the trust survey outcome from this test since both were universally conducted prior to the trust game, so there is
no way playing first as a sender or receiver could have possibly influenced behavior in those exercises.
Table A28: Distance Between Partner Villages by Radio Rwanda reception
Dependent Variable: Distance between the Villages of the Partners
in Private Games
Sample (game-type): Inter-Ethnic Co-Ethnic Inter-Ethnic Co-Ethnic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Radio Rwanda Reception (of sender) -2.487 1.197 7.818 7.422
(7.369) (5.505) (7.130) (6.209)
Equality of Coefficients (p-value) 0.582 0.948
Controls Baseline Full
Trust-game specific controls Yes Yes
Observations 92 150 92 150
R2 0.700 0.534 0.840 0.648
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 14.7 19.7 14.7 19.7
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. All regressions include controls for: gender of partner; whether partner receives Radio Rwanda; enumerator
of trust game fixed effects; and risk tolerance. All regressions using the baseline set of controls include controls for: district
fixed effects; enumerator fixed effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel time by car to first, second, and
third nearest radio towers; RTLM; light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone
usage at the village level; and Raven Cognitive Test score. All regressions using the full set of controls include all the baseline
controls as well as: intensity of genocide; log income; share of village which is Tutsi; years of education; village elevation;
variance in sector’s elevation; log sector population; sector population density; cardinal direction village faces. The dependent
variable in each regression is the Euclidian distance between the village centroids of the two partners in kilometers. Equality of
Coefficients (p-value) tests the equality of the estimates reported in column 1 and 2 as well as 3 and 4.
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Table A29: Opponent Radio and Return Offers
Dependent Variable: Amount of Offer Returned Trust Game Offer
Sample: Inter-ethnic Co-ethnic Inter-ethnic Co-ethnic Inter-ethnic Co-ethnic Inter-ethnic Co-ethnic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Private Games
Radio Rwanda Reception 215.7** 9.799 224.2* -65.53 148.5*** 10.79 168.6*** -53.02
(94.02) (62.99) (116.9) (85.68) (53.31) (32.69) (54.42) (41.96)
Partner Radio Reception -13.36 -14.74 -89.23 -1.377 18.13 -16.26 7.175 -8.665
(52.70) (36.29) (78.36) (38.09) (28.61) (27.46) (49.29) (27.69)
Controls Baseline Baseline Full Full Baseline Baseline Full Full
Trust-game specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 92 150 92 150 92 150 92 150
R2 0.563 0.343 0.636 0.390 0.676 0.406 0.726 0.490
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 335 344 335 344 325 342 325 342
Panel B: Public Games
Radio Rwanda Reception -55.29 23.17 40.74 -26.51 -37.60 1.248 0.473 -52.67
(125.5) (75.72) (162.9) (104.8) (59.07) (55.85) (77.24) (65.05)
Opponent Radio Reception 60.01 -6.694 111.9 -23.72 73.92 -62.11 75.48 -46.88
(69.02) (62.47) (114.1) (71.21) (51.82) (39.69) (79.08) (62.69)
Controls Baseline Baseline Full Full Baseline Baseline Full Full
Trust-game specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 71 125 71 125 71 125 71 125
R2 0.598 0.436 0.695 0.502 0.744 0.389 0.799 0.486
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 390 426 390 426 355 358 355 358
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. All regressions include controls for: gender of partner; whether partner receives Radio Rwanda; enumerator
of trust game fixed effects; and risk tolerance. All regressions using the baseline set of controls include controls for: district
fixed effects; enumerator fixed effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel time by car to first, second, and
third nearest radio towers; RTLM; light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone
usage at the village level; and Raven Cognitive Test score. All regressions using the full set of controls include all the baseline
controls as well as: intensity of genocide; log income; share of village which is Tutsi; years of education; village elevation;
variance in sector’s elevation; log sector population; sector population density; cardinal direction village faces.
Table A30: Effect of Radio Rwanda on Salience on Other Photo Observables
Dependent Variable: SIT score (WithinError
TotalError
)
Shirt Colour Background Shirt Type Facial Hair Jacket
(light versus dark) (city versus local) (collar versus no-collar) (moustache versus none) (Jacket versus no-Jacket)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Radio Rwanda -0.000852 -0.0659 0.00636 0.0152 0.0216
(0.0626) (0.0435) (0.0432) (0.0402) (0.0532)
Controls Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline
Observations 438 438 438 438 438
R2 0.189 0.174 0.166 0.136 0.168
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 0.807 0.926 0.795 0.807 0.820
Note: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. All regressions using the baseline set
of controls include controls for: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and
travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM; light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest
city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; and Raven Cognitive Test score. For each case the dependent
variable is reconstructed using the characteristic under consideration. For example, in column 1 the within-error component of
the SIT is recomputed to see if subjects are more likely to choose someone wearing a light shirt if the person for the correct
answer was wearing a light shirt. The denominator is the same for each variable.
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Table A31: Trust game offers and trust game return offers, by game type
Dependent Variable: Return Offers
Private Games Public Games
Inter-Ethnic Co-Ethnic Inter-Ethnic Co-Ethnic Inter-Ethnic Co-Ethnic Inter-Ethnic Co-Ethnic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Trust Game Offer 1.138*** 1.006*** 1.131*** 1.057*** 1.030*** 1.113*** 1.094*** 1.103***
(0.212) (0.126) (0.183) (0.137) (0.265) (0.108) (0.267) (0.141)
Wald Test for Coefficient equal one (p-value) 0.529 0.755 0.551 0.476 0.991 0.265 0.817 0.474
Equality of Coefficients (p-value) 0.725 0.931 0.623 0.886
Controls Baseline Full Baseline Full
Trust-game specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 241 241 241 241 196 196 196 196
R2 0.750 0.646 0.797 0.675 0.736 0.741 0.819 0.757
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 335 344 335 344 390 426 390 426
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. All regressions include controls for: gender of partner; whether partner receives Radio Rwanda; enumerator
of trust game fixed effects; distance between partners’ villages; and risk tolerance. All regressions using the baseline set of
controls include controls for: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and
travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM; light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest
city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; and Raven Cognitive Test score. All regressions using the
full set of controls include all the baseline controls as well as: intensity of genocide; log income; share of village which is Tutsi;
years of education; village elevation; variance in sector’s elevation; log sector population; sector population density; cardinal
direction village faces.
Table A32: Public Treatment and SIT
Dependent Variable: SIT score (WithinError
TotalError
) SIT score (WithinError
2
TotalError
) SIT (WithinError
TotalError
> 0.42)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Public Information 0.0265 0.0181 0.0108 -0.0398 -0.0285 -0.0123 0.00484 -0.00409 -0.00226
(0.0246) (0.0266) (0.0242) (0.0715) (0.0704) (0.0606) (0.0258) (0.0267) (0.0269)
Controls Baseline Full Full Baseline Full Full Baseline Full Full
Mistake FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 438 438 438 438 438 438 438 438 438
R2 0.201 0.228 0.421 0.133 0.163 0.410 0.134 0.176 0.274
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 0.855 0.855 0.855 1.243 1.243 1.243 0.916 0.916 0.916
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. All regressions using the baseline set of controls include controls for: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed
effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM;
light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; and
Raven Cognitive Test score. All regressions using the full set of controls include all the baseline controls as well as: intensity
of genocide; log income; share of village which is Tutsi; years of education; village elevation; variance in sector’s elevation; log
sector population; sector population density; cardinal direction village faces.
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Appendix B. Heterogeneity
We now examine the heterogeneity in the impact of living in villages that receive Radio
Rwanda on the reduction in the salience of ethnic identity as well as changes in inter-ethnic
trust. We examine several aspects of the underlying heterogeneity: age, gender, Hutu or
Tutsi ethnicity as well as pre-existing levels of ethnic salience.
B.1. Distributional Effects:
It would be useful to know whether the reduction in the salience of ethnicity was across-the-
board or whether it was concentrated amongst those for whom salience was (for example)
high to begin with. We examine this using a quantile regression with results presented in
table B1 The table (and associated graph) suggest that while the effect of radio does not work
only on the people who already have the best inter-ethnic attitudes, among those with room
for improvement, there does not seem to be much heterogeneity in the effect. This can be
seen from the relatively constant estimates we get in the 30%-90% range of the distribution.
This in its own right is somewhat interesting as it suggests that there is not a large fraction
of people that select out of listening to Radio Rwanda. This is perhaps because it is so
frequently the only source of news and entertainment in rural Rwanda.
Table B1: Quantile Regression of Radio Rwanda on SIT
Dependent Variable: Salience of Identity Test
15th percentile 30th percentile 45th percentile 60th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Radio Rwanda Reception -0.010 -0.0589** -0.0544*** -0.0316*** -0.0355*** -0.0419*
(0.0767) (0.0229) (0.0159) (0.0157) (0.0131) (0.0216)
Controls Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline
Observations 438 438 438 438 438 438
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. All regressions using the baseline set of controls include controls for: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed
effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM;
light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; and
Raven Cognitive Test score.
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Figure B1: Point Estimates and 95% Confidence intervals from a quantile regression of %
within ethnicity SIT errors on reception of Radio Rwanda
B.2. Heterogeneity by Ethnicity:
In panel A of table B2 we look at whether the Hutu or Tutsi are more influenced by the radio.
There may be some reason for this to go both ways. The Hutu were the perpetrators of the
genocide and persuading this group might be most beneficial to Kagame (both for staying in
power and preventing another violent outbreak). However on the other hand Radio Rwanda
is known to be a government-run (and mostly Tutsi-run) station, so Tutsi may be more likely
to listen, and may be more likely to trust the information being broadcast. We actually find
similar estimates for both groups. The SIT is influenced by radio slightly more for Tutsi,
but the partner selection task variable seems more driven by Hutu. For both of the trust
estimates the Tutsi estimate is slightly larger, but both are large, and we can not statistically
distinguish effects from each other.
B.3. Heterogeneity by Age:
If we look at heterogeneity by age (panel B) we see a similar pattern. Both the old and young
seem influenced by the radio. We might have expected the attitudes of the older generation
to be more entrenched, especially since they experienced the genocide first hand. While this
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does seem somewhat true - most estimates are larger and more precise for the young group
- we again can not statistically distinguish any differential effect between the two groups.
B.4. Heterogeneity by Gender:
In panel C we examine heterogeneity by gender. The trend of little evidence of a heteroge-
neous effect persists here as well. Both men and women are impacted in very similar ways
to Radio Rwanda broadcasts.
B.5. Colonial History of Forced Labor:
Panel D presents heterogeneity by colonial history. Here the heterogeneity in the effect seems
more clear, and is consistent with the distributional analysis. Most of the impact of Radio
Rwanda is felt in regions with a history of inter-ethnic conflict. Regions where Tutsi forced
Hutu to work on coffee plantations without pay, are still the regions with the most ethnic
distrust (Blouin, 2017). However, they also appear to be the regions that respond more to
reconciliation efforts. In particular, we see fairly stark contrasts in the effect of radio on
partner selection and the trust survey question. In both cases there are significantly larger
positive estimates in the historically troubled villages.
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Table B2: Heterogeneity (by ethnicity, age, gender and colonial history) in the effect of of
living in a village that receives a signal from Radio Rwanda on % within-ethnicity SIT errors;
selection for a partner of the other ethnicity; answer to a survey question on out-group trust;
and private inter-ethnic trust game offers
Dependent Variable: SIT Partner Selection Out-Group Inter-Ethnic Trust
Trust (survey) Game Offer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A - Heterogeneity by Ethnicity
Tutsi Hutu Tutsi Hutu Tutsi Hutu Tutsi Hutu
Radio Rwanda Signal -0.202 -0.187** 0.0721 0.201*** 0.275 0.221* -569.6 265.4
(0.193) (0.0759) (0.117) (0.0550) (0.328) (0.128) (1,496) (197.9)
Observations 121 317 121 317 121 317 48 44
R2 0.415 0.227 0.416 0.217 0.527 0.188 0.856 0.779
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 0.909 0.919 0.688 0.311 2.80 2.98 340 305
Panel B - Heterogeneity by Age
Young Old Young Old Young Old Young Old
Radio Rwanda Signal -0.176** -0.296*** 0.242*** 0.115** 0.161 0.157 366.1 378.0*
(0.0793) (0.101) (0.0651) (0.0573) (0.218) (0.174) (0) (192.5)
Observations 177 261 177 261 177 261 35 57
R2 0.313 0.353 0.427 0.499 0.301 0.207 1.000 0.658
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 0.937 0.901 0.404 0.432 2.87 2.96 330 322
Panel C - Heterogeneity by Gender
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Radio Rwanda Signal -0.214*** -0.0821 0.241*** 0.0140 0.364* 0.280 313.7 268.9**
(0.0639) (0.0861) (0.0459) (0.0368) (0.200) (0.168) (191.6) (97.41)
Observations 262 176 262 176 262 176 44 48
R2 0.237 0.220 0.452 0.506 0.214 0.317 0.780 0.694
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 0.936 0.902 0.403 0.432 2.87 2.96 330 323
Panel D - Heterogeneity by Colonial History
Corve´e No Corve´e Corve´e No Corve´e Corve´e No Corve´e Corve´e No Corve´e
Radio Rwanda Signal -0.173** -0.117 0.185*** 0.00932 0.399** -0.0267 116.1 255.0
(0.0699) (0.0897) (0.0392) (0.0780) (0.173) (0.179) (89.01) (518.5)
Controls Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline
Observations 301 137 301 137 301 137 60 32
R2 0.161 0.267 0.417 0.536 0.150 0.357 0.531 0.937
Control Group Mean of Dependent Variable 0.909 0.931 0.406 0.450 2.93 2.92 294 375
Note: Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. All regressions using the baseline set of controls include controls for: district fixed effects; enumerator fixed
effects; gender; ethnicity; age; both distance (km) and travel time by car to first, second, and third nearest radio towers; RTLM;
light density; distance (km) to nearest road, nearest city, and Kigali; prevalence of cell phone usage at the village level; and
Raven Cognitive Test score. In each specification we split the sample along different dimensions of heterogeneity. The binary
classifications are determined as follows: panel A - Hutu/Tutsi; panel B - above/below median age; panel C - male/female;
panel D - coffee was / was not the most profitable crop in the colonial era (see Blouin, 2017).
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Appendix C. Steps to Replicate Radio Signal
In ArcGIS:
III. Import village location csv file
III. Export the file to get ID numbers (otherwise buffer will not work)
III. Construct a buffer around the points using the “Buffer” tool in “Analysis Tools”
• Set buffer size to radius 0.017dd (just larger than the resolution of the radio data)
In the program RadioMobile:
III. Click Unit Properties and add all of the towers, and their info as listed in the paper
III. Add each network according to the network and tower information in the paper
III. For each:
a choose mode of variability: broadcast
b Surface refractivity: 310
c Ground conductivity: 0.005
d Relative Ground Permittivity: 15
e Polarization: Vertical
f Climate: Equatorial
g Variability % of time: 60
h Variability % of location: 60
i Variability % of situations: 60
j Topology: Visible and Voice-net (Command/Subordinate/Rebroadcast)
III. Click “Combined Cartesian Radio Coverage”
a Add the relevant towers and the relevant network.
b Set a mobile unit set to 2m off the ground
c Set maximum range to 200km
d Link direction: MobileRX
e Mode: All picture
f Signal range to draw: dbuV/m
g Draw size (pixels): 3
h From (≥): 0
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